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I.  INTRODUCTION 
People are more than their brains. Legal and social 
traditions have long held people accountable for their behavior 
under the presumption that most behavior is intentional and 
the product of conscious decision-making.1 The elementary 
premise that actions have legal and social consequences is 
firmly embedded in the vernacular of most cultures.2 When 
                                                          
 2010 Steven K. Erickson. 
* Steven K. Erickson is a visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of 
Missouri School of Law. He is deeply indebted to the thoughtful comments 
provided by Stephanos Bibas, Stephen Morse, Jon Klick, Amy Wax, Jeff 
Rachlinski, David Skeel, Michael Perlin, Paul Litton and the participants of 
the ad hoc faculty workshop series at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. Bill Draper provided excellent research assistance. 
 1. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (“The 
contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted with by 
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent 
in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a 
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good 
and evil.”); Roscoe Pound, Introduction to FRANCIS BOWES SAYRE, A 
SELECTION OF CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW, at xxxvi-xxxvii (1927) (“Historically, 
our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the vicious 
will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right 
and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong.”). 
 2. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: 
Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8–11 
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someone breaches a legal or social code, the whole person is 
considered responsible for her behavior and not some 
constituent part of her entity that bears the punishment. 
Unlike machines, people are measured in their totalitya bad 
part does not render a person worthless. 
Yet emerging conceptions of personhood generated by 
cognitive neuroscience suggest something very different from 
this entrenched view.3 Instead of people, cognitive neuroscience 
posits brains as the exclusive agents of behavior and suggests 
brains are incapable of blame because of their mechanical and 
determined nature.4 Minds and brains are held 
synonymousthoughts, desires, and behaviors are regarded as 
no more than the yield of fixed neuronal tissue.5 All mentation 
is considered exclusively the product of brain structure and 
function, which is accessible, measurable, and predictable using 
an array of novel technologies understood by a select few. This 
view has led to speculation that an inevitable and radical 
overhaul of legal and social constructions of personal 
responsibility is invariably at hand.6 Much of the recent legal 
                                                          
(2007); James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1 (1993). 
 3. See Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and 
Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 271–74 (2002); Joshua Greene & 
Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 
359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1775, 1780–81 (2004); Maureen Sie & 
Arno Wouters, The Real Challenge to Free Will and Responsibility, 12 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 3, 3 (2007) (“Recent developments in the behavioral-, 
cognitive- and neurosciences indicate that, more often than not, we act in an 
automatic and unaware fashion, making up reasons only as we go along.”). 
 4. For an overview of the arguments see Adina Roskies, Neuroscientific 
Challenges to Free Will and Responsibility, 10 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 419 
(2006); see also Jeffery M. Schwartz et al., Quantum Physics in Neuroscience 
and Psychology: A Neurophsyical Model of Mind-Brain Interaction, 360 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1309, 1313–15 (2005) (discussing ways classic 
physics lends to understanding mental capacity: (1) as a casually impotent 
sideshow of the brain or (2) as the very same thing as some pattern of the 
brain’s various tiny parts). 
 5. As it was famously put “your joys and your sorrows, your memories 
and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no 
more than a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.” 
FRANCIS CRICK, THE ASTONISHING HYPOTHESIS: THE SCIENTIFIC SEARCH FOR 
THE SOUL 3 (1994); see also MARVIN L. MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND 287 
(1986) (“Minds are simply what brains do.”); Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 
1779 (“It is not as if there is you, the composer, and then your brain, the 
orchestra. You are your brain.”). 
 6. See DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL 15886 (2001); 
Oliver R. Goodenough & Kristin Prehn, A Neuroscientific Approach to 
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scholarship concerned with criminal responsibility as of late 
has invested heavily in the notion that the findings of biological 
sciences promise a fundamental shift away from orthodox 
notions of criminal liability.7 Some view the incorporation of 
neuroscience within the law as a harbinger of change for 
sentencing practices;8 others as a welcome aid in shifting 
punishment away from a retributive-based enterprise to one 
solely focused on future offender propensities;9 while still 
others envision a dramatic diminution of the jury’s province.10 
All share the belief that the impact of neuroscience on the law 
in the coming years will be inevitable, dramatic, and will 
fundamentally alter the way the law does business.11 And 
nowhere is this promise endorsed with more gusto than in 
discussions of responsibility and criminal liability. 
Such renditions of culpability under this rubric of the 
neuro-person are usually couched with the belief that 
incorporating cognitive neuroscience into our legal institutions 
                                                          
Normative Judgment in Law and Justice, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL 
SOC’Y B 1709, 1718–21 (2004) (describing how neuroscience will change 
conceptions of morals, justice and normative judgment). But see Stephen J. 
Morse, Brain and Blame 84 GEO. L.J. 527, 531 (1996) (describing the 
“fundamental psycholegal error” of assuming causation equates to excuse for 
matters of criminal culpability). 
 7. These views are undoubtedly embedded in a strict biological view of 
personhood and personal agency that the law has long resisted. See, e.g., Owen 
D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 405, 419 (2005) (decrying “the near-total absence of recognition in 
legal thinking that all behavior, and all the brain activity that perceives and 
directs it, are fundamentally biological phenomena . . .”). 
 8. See Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not 
Responsibility but Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1103–04 (2008) 
(“[A]dvances in neuroscience will change, dramatically, the criminal justice 
system . . . . [W]e may see major changes in how crimes are investigated, in 
how trials are conducted, in how sentencing decisions are reached, and in 
what kinds of sentences are imposed.”). 
 9. See Christopher Slobogin, The Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 121, 157–65 (2005) (describing how neuroscience supports a 
forward-oriented theory of criminal punishment). 
 10. See Julia Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 46675 (2008) 
(arguing that neuroscience may supplant the juror’s role in determining 
witness credibility and unveil the secrecy of juror decision-making). 
 11. The pace at which legal scholarship has embraced neurolaw is evident 
in the numerous professional conferences, institutes, and large-scale projects 
undertaken at various law schools. See Ken Strutin, Neurolaw and Criminal 
Justice, LLRX.COM, Dec. 28, 2008, http://www.llrx.com/features/neurolaw.htm. 
The title of one such conference held at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of 
Law was telling: “The Law and Ethics of Brain Scanning: The Next Big Thing 
Coming Soon to a Courtroom Near You?” 
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will lead to more just and compassionate outcomes for criminal 
defendants.12 The idea that current regimes of culpability and 
punishment are influenced imprudently by retributive 
principles of justice looms large in the neurolaw discussion.13 
Proponents of the neuro-person model suggest that blaming 
people for behavior that is merely a product of their brains is 
both foolish and unfair.14 If the brain and the mind are the 
same and behavior is entirely determined a brain’s micro-
events, which are largely (if not entirely) automatic and 
unconscious, then it follows that blame has no place in modern 
conceptions of agency and criminal law. Indeed, the rise of the 
neuro-person model coincides with the emergence of the 
therapeutic justice movement, which seeks to supplant 
traditional criminal punishment frameworks with behavior-
based interventional models of criminal justice under the idea 
that criminal conduct is essentially a mental health 
phenomenon.15 People commit crimes not because they are 
                                                          
 12. See, e.g., PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, THE ENGINE OF REASON, THE SEAT 
OF THE SOUL: A PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNEY INTO THE BRAIN 309 (1996) (“[W]e 
are likely to see a revolution in the ways that society deals with the broad 
spectrum of pathological social behavior. A neurally informed and 
technologically sophisticated society will be able to make judgments reliably 
and do things effectively, where the current practice is groping and 
impotent.”); Jana L. Bufkin & Vickie R. Luttrel, Neuroimaging Studies of 
Aggressive and Violence Behavior: Current Findings and Implications for 
Criminology and Criminal Justice, 6 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 176, 186 
(2005) 
Justice is typically defined as just deserts. As a result, legal variables 
with no inherent explanatory worth are summoned to justify less-
than-stellar community-level interventions and unproductive 
institutionalization. In contrast, the type of justice conceived in an 
interdisciplinary program of study is rehabilitation oriented. Its 
programs and policies are aimed at therapeutic justice. 
Id. 
 13. At the heart of this argument is retribution’s focus on blame during 
the commission of the crime compared to the forward-focused instrumentality 
crime-control polices ostensibly provided by neuroscience-based conceptions of 
agency which fix prediction of future harm, intervention, and incapacitation as 
the preferred goals of criminal justice. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 
1783–84; Slobogin, supra note 9, at 122. 
 14. See, e.g., Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal 
Justice System, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 1787, 1794 (2004) 
(“[A]lthough it may seem dehumanizing to medicalize people into being broken 
cars, it can be vastly more humane than moralizing them into being sinners.”). 
 15. See GERRY JOHNSTONE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 94 (2002) (“Proponents 
of therapeutic interventions regard much criminal behaviour as symptomatic 
of underlying psychiatric disorder. . . .”). 
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motivated by greed or malice but because they are sick and in 
need of treatmentthey have impaired brains. 
But there are problems with the neuro-person model. 
Despite the claim by neuroscientists that the mind is 
accessible, measurable, and predictable, there are good reasons 
for skepticism on all of these fronts. Cognitive neuroscience, 
like all fields of science, utilizes assumptions to generate its 
conclusions. Chief among these is that the complexity of the 
mind can be understood by examining localized areas of the 
brain which are presumed indicative of how people think. The 
proliferation of various brain imaging technologies has 
endowed the popular press and public with a powerful and 
accessible model of the mind, which propagates this localization 
view of mentation.16 This model has been augmented by an 
abundance of highly publicized studies suggesting a link 
between certain defined behaviors and some part of the brain 
by way of impressive pictures of measured brain activity. Many 
of these studies claim to have located areas of the brain 
responsible for addiction,17 violence,18 wisdom,19 and even 
morality.20 These exceedingly complex behaviors are said to 
originate in highly defined, independent modules of cognitive 
function located within specific regions of the brain. In a scant 
twenty years, pictorial brain imaging has become common 
parlance for understanding all aspects of human thought and 
                                                          
 16. One study documented over 130 unique press articles covering brain 
imaging between 1994–2004a number that has surely multiplied in 
succeeding years. See Eric Racine et al., Brain Imaging: A Decade of Coverage 
in the Print Media, 28 SCI. COMM. 122, 128 (2006); see also, e.g., Robert Lee 
Hotz, The Brain, Your Honor, Will Take the Witness Stand, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
16, 2009, at A7 (reporting on researchers who used a brain scanner to examine 
how brain cells behave when assessing criminal responsibility and meting out 
sentences); Jeffery Rosen, The Brain on the Stand: How Neuroscience is 
Transforming the Legal System, N.Y. TIMES MAG., March 11, 2007, at 48 
(reporting generally on how recent neuroscience discoveries is transforming 
the legal system). 
 17. See, e.g., Rita Z. Goldstein et al., Subjective Sensitivity to Monetary 
Gradients is Associated with Frontolimbic Activation to Reward in Cocaine 
Abusers, 87 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 233 passim (2007). 
 18. See, e.g., Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg et al., Neural Mechanisms of 
Genetic Risk for Impulsivity and Violence in Humans, 103 PROC.NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. U.S. 6269 passim (2006). 
 19. See, e.g., Thomas W. Meeks & Dilip V. Jeste, Neurobiology of Wisdom, 
66 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 355 passim (2009). 
 20. See, e.g., Adrian Raine & Yaling Yang, Neural Foundations to Moral 
Reasoning and Antisocial Behavior, 1 SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE 203 passim (2006). 
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behavior. 
Indeed, there appears to be no limit to explaining all 
aspects of humanity under the neuro-person model–only 
technology limits its application. Yet it is inescapable that the 
novel and powerful technology of brain imaging available to 
neuroscientists invariably drives their conception of the mind.21 
And that technology assumes that brains operate linearly, are 
stable over time, and that behavior is predictable from localized 
brain states. Much evidence abounds, however, that brains do 
not operate in this fashion. Behavior and brains influence each 
other; brains are dynamic and constantly in flux; and behavior 
is the outcome of a range of responses to stimuli. Brain activity 
is a global phenomenon, not merely a localized one within 
compartments of the brain, even for simple behaviors. 
Most cognitive neuroscience studies of higher ordered 
behavior likewise assume a unidirectional view of behavior and 
brain activity: localized electrical impulses within the brain 
cause behavior, and therefore, bad behavior is always the 
consequence of brain activity beyond the conscious control of 
the person. Yet this view ignores a wealth of neuroscience 
evidence which shows that brains are dynamic and malleable 
with their structure and function readily changed by behavior 
itself.22 To put it differently, behaviors influence brains 
inasmuch as brains determine behavior. This more integrated 
view of brains and behavior is of particular relevance to 
questions of culpability and responsibility where it is often 
assumed that a damaged brain should entail mitigation and 
excuse. On the contrary, if behavior influences brain structure 
and function, then under some circumstances, a damaged brain 
may evince willful engagement in deleterious behavior. 
This more nuanced view of the brain stands as a hurdle for 
those who eagerly suggest dispensing with established 
                                                          
 21. See WILLIAM R. UTTAL, NEUROSCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 15–26 
(2009). 
 22. As it was once assumed brains did not change structurally or 
functionally in adulthood, it is now understood that brains are constantly in 
flux through a process known as neuroplasticity. See Schwartz et al., supra 
note 4 passim; see generally Alvaro Pascual-Leone et al., The Plastic Human 
Brain Cortex, 28 ANN. REV. NEUROSCIENCE 377, 378 (2005) (“[P]lasticity is an 
intrinsic property of the nervous system retained throughout a lifespan 
and . . . The brain, as the source of human behavior, is by design molded by 
environmental changes and pressures, physiologic modifications, and 
experiences.”). 
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doctrines of culpability and responsibility. In their zeal to adopt 
a culpability and punishment regime that relinquishes desert 
in favor of incapacitation and prediction of future 
dangerousness,23 those who embrace the neuro-person model 
seem all too willing to accept a view of personhood that 
invariably trivializes the ability of individuals to exert control 
over their own behaviors in favor of one which reduces 
humanity to the indiscriminate ebb and flow of chemicals 
between neurons.24 The fact that even those chemical 
messengers remain poorly understood appears to do little to 
curb the enthusiasm for this breathtaking endeavor.25 
And that enthusiasm seems odd given the implications of 
the neuro-person model. While supporters grudgingly admit 
that biological science has an ugly history when applied to the 
law, few harbor fears that such mistakes would repeat 
themselves.26 Instead, most neurolaw talk embraces the 
promise of changing minds by changing brains through a 
therapeutic model of criminal justice that views retributive 
punishment as inhumane, but classifying and modifying brains 
by their state as a great triumph of rehabilitation. As one 
leading scholar suggested, there is no real difference between 
prison and lobotomy.27 
                                                          
 23. See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 9, at 122 (“The criminal law ought to 
embrace the dangerousness criterion, with the significant caveat that it do so 
wholeheartedly. . . .”). 
 24. See generally Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 426 (“Synaptic 
connections in the brain ebb and flow–not only over the course of a lifetime, 
but during a single day.”). While Jones and Goldsmith are undoubtedly correct 
in their assessment of synaptic physiology, this and similar biological facts do 
not sufficiently explain why people behave as they do. Rather, they merely 
describe physiological function. Cf. UTTAL, supra note 21, at 23–24 (detailing 
the fallacy that description equates an explanation). 
 25. See, e.g., Theodore H. Bullock et al., The Neuron Doctrine, Redux, 310 
SCI. 791, 792 (2005) (describing the shifting understanding of how 
neurotransmitters contribute to neuronal communications). Bullock and 
colleagues question “what features of the human brain account for our level of 
behavioral complexity? It is doubtful that the answer emerges from knowing 
the sheer number of cells, or the properties of synapses, or the identity of 
neurotransmitters and modulators.” Id. 
 26. See Greely, supra note 8, at 1133 (“We should not view the fact that 
these possible interventions would intervene directly in a subject’s brain as 
necessarily disqualifying them. Many . . . justifications for criminal sanctions 
work by affecting a criminal’s brain.”); Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 
499 (acknowledging that science could be misapplied in a legal context, but 
arguing that societal fears should not bar the sensible use of scientific 
knowledge). 
 27. See Greely, supra note 8, at 1134 (“I see no qualitative difference 
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This credulous fervor for neurolaw hides its secret 
ambition. Those who view desert as an improvident distributive 
theory of punishment are many, but few suggest dispensing 
with the criminal justice system wholesale. Yet much of the 
neuro-person model’s construction of culpability lies with the 
view that crime itself is a mental illness and not behavior of 
lawless citizens.28 They consider crime the product of impaired 
brains and scientists are best suited for handling criminal 
justice policy, not lawyers. Once crime is understood as a 
behavioral problem rooted in the impaired brains of many 
unfortunate citizens, ameliorating crime will properly involve 
civil remedies instead of criminal ones. Therapeutic justice has 
already made substantial inroads under the reasonable view 
that criminal justice policy should encompass provisions which 
reduce offender recidivism. But in doing so, therapeutic justice 
seems all too eager in to jettison the adversarial system of 
justice in place of one which values intervention at the cost of 
adversarial rights and individual liberty by implementing 
adjudication forums that greatly diminish zealous advocacy by 
counsel. The very nature of the criminal justice system as one 
entrenched in laws which restrain government is quite foreign 
to therapeutic justice. And that is troublesome given the 
reemergence of the therapeutic state. 
The balance of this Article is organized as follows. Part II 
explains the birth of neurolaw as a movement rooted in the 
construction of the mind by cognitive neuroscience and 
discusses the problems with that model of the mind. Part III 
examines the ambition and consequence of these constituent 
parts. The Conclusion offers some thoughts on neurolaw’s 
implications. 
II.  THE BIRTH OF NEUROLAW 
Neurolaw owes its fame to a modest and seemingly 
                                                          
between acting directly to change a criminal’s brain–through drugs, surgery, 
DBS, or vaccines, if proven safe and effective–and acting indirectly–through 
punishment, rehabilitation, cognitive therapy, parole conditions–to achieve 
similar ends.”). 
 28. See generally ADRIAN RAINE, THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME: 
CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AS A CLINICAL DISORDER (1997) (discussing the 
arguments and counterarguments for considering crime a disorder); Alec 
Buchanan & Howard Zonana, Mental Disorder as the Cause of a Crime, 32 
INT’L. J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 142, 142–43 (2009) (arguing that psychiatry 
evidence should be used more in criminal proceedings). 
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innocuous beginning. Lawyer J. Sherrod Taylor coined the term 
during the early 1990s to describe the “converging courses” of 
neuropsychology and the legal system.29 Adopted to explain the 
growing influence of expert testimony by neuropsychologists in 
brain-injury civil suits, neurolaw’s initial focus rested on 
obtaining financial remedies for people with traumatic brain 
injuries.30 As such, neurolaw had little ambition to modify 
criminal law doctrine or add to the debates of culpability and 
responsibility. Instead, neurolaw’s domain lay chiefly with 
providing financial awards through civil litigation under the 
principle that monetary gains improved clinical outcomes for 
people with established brain injuries.31 
But the allure of neurolaw from its conception was its 
ability to describe personhood by reference to structural and 
functional aspects of the brain. And this appeal was derived in 
large measure by powerful new technologies which gave 
unprecedented access to living brains. Brain imaging proved 
immensely useful not only for scientific inquiry but because the 
pictorial quality of the images it produced easily translated 
brains into entities that were accessible to non-scientists.32 
Even laypersons ponder at times how their brains manifest in 
the material world. Brain imaging allowed the non-
neuroscientist to peer inside the brain’s fantastic intricacy and 
discern a rudimentary understanding of how the human 
                                                          
 29. See J. Sherrod Taylor et al., Neuropsychologists and Neurolawyers, 5 
NEUROPSYCHOL. 293, 293 (1991). 
 30. See J. Sherrod Taylor, Neurolaw: Towards a New Medical 
Jurisprudence, 9 BRAIN INJ. 745, 746 (1995) (“The central thesis of neurolaw 
proposes that financial resources obtained through civil justice remedies 
contribute to improving the quality of life for persons with TBI [traumatic 
brain injury] and their families.”). 
 31. See J. Sherrod Taylor, An Overview of Neurolaw for the Clinician: 
What Every Potential Witness Should Know, 16 NEUROREHABILITATION 69, 69 
(2001) (“[N]eurolaw provides that better legal outcomes promote better clinical 
outcomes for patients with neurological injury.”). 
 32. Non-experts are more willing to find explanations accompanied by 
brain images as more creditable. See David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, 
Seeing Is Believing: The Effect of Brain Images on Judgments of Scientific 
Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343, 349–50 (2008). Even without pictures of the 
brain, explanations prefaced by the words “neuroscience explains” persuade 
people to accept causal events. See Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The 
Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE 470, 475 (2008) (finding that even irrelevant neuroscience 
information leads non-experts to prefer and accept explanations of behavior 
even when there are salient problems with the explanations as a whole). 
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experience involves an organ weighing about 3 pounds.33 
The ability of this new neuroscience to make the complex 
simple is also what made it ideal for the law. Science and law 
are often said to exist on different dimensions: law operates 
chiefly through deduction, logic, and precedent; science is based 
on the scientific method, which values empirical and 
measurable phenomena as its centerpiece.34 As such, science is 
increasingly multifaceted as the wealth of scientific information 
is exponential: we know much more about the world now than 
we did in the past. The consequence of this overflow of 
information means that the nuances of scientific explanations 
when applied to legal questions are often in tension with the 
established precedents of legal doctrine. 
The simplicity of brain scanning images promises to 
overcome that difficulty. Ageless questions of how and why 
people think and behave as they do are considered fully 
explainable under the purview of neuroimaging by its 
supporters. The access that neuroimaging provides to living 
brains and the assumption that brain states equates all 
mentation easily wed it to a variety of legal questions.35 Within 
the past several years, that road has ventured to the 
foundational tenets of responsibility and culpability. As 
neurolaw questions the very idea that people can choose their 
behavior, it inevitably questions the legitimacy and role of 
punishment. 
A.  BRAINS WITHOUT MINDS 
The draw of neurolaw is a gloss of intrigue and seduction. 
Why people behave the way that they do is a perpetual and 
universal question. That question has often been understood to 
                                                          
 33. See PAUL GLEES, THE HUMAN BRAIN 102 (2005). 
 34. See Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945) 
(“The modern science of psychology is concerned with diagnosis and 
therapeutics and not with moral judgments. It proceeds on an entirely 
different set of assumptions [than the criminal law does].”); Gino C. Speranza, 
The Medico-Legal Conflict over Mental Responsibility, 13 GREEN BAG 123, 
124–25 (1901) (“[L]aw and medicine represent distinct currents or forces of 
thought . . . .”). 
 35. Most scholarship has centered on the use of neuroimaging in 
deception detection, yet there are numerous methodological problems with 
even this straightforward use. See, Sean A. Spence, Playing Devil’s Advocate: 
The Case Against fMRI Lie Detection, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 
11, 22–24 (2008). 
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entail some subjectivity across individuals and cultures.36 
Beyond the basilar needs of appetites and social bonding, 
diverging views of what causes people to behave as they do are 
copious and disputed.37 Even within the behavioral sciences, 
there is much disagreement about why people behave as they 
do. For many years, the Freudians persuaded scientists and 
non-experts alike that behavior was the product of 
psychosexual drives established mostly during early childhood 
under the command of an immaterial unconsciousness.38 In 
succeeding years, behaviorism proposed that external 
behaviors were the mind and that the mechanics operating 
within the brain were irrelevant.39 Other theories abound but 
most hold to the immutable premise that people direct their 
behavior at least some of the time. Even under the subterfuge 
of the unconscious, psychoanalysis claimed that people acted 
because they had reasonseven when they were unaware of 
them. 
The path of cognitive neuroscience stands in contrast. The 
foundational walls upon which it rests hold unwaveringly to 
the tenets of classical physics, reductive materialism, and hard 
determinism. Implicit in this model is the notion that, in time, 
all human experiences will be accessible by various physical 
apparatuses designed to explore the brain, that all mentation 
will be measurable by these devices, and that accurate 
predictions of future behavior by way of brain activity can be 
made solely by understanding the material properties of the 
brain.40 While alternative psychological theories hold to some of 
these premises, cognitive neuroscience confidently suggests our 
perception of personhood grounded in the sense that we choose 
how to act is false and untenable.41 Instead we are automatons, 
                                                          
 36. See Paulo Sousa, On Folk Conceptions of Mind, Agency and Morality, 
6 J. COGNITION & CULTURE 1 (2006) (discussing the connection between folk 
conceptions of mind, agency, and morality and scientific scrutiny of those 
conceptions). 
 37. Id. at 9–14 (discussing different scholars’ interpretations of the folk 
concept of free will). 
 38. See STEPHEN A. MITCHELL & MARGARET J. BLACK, FREUD AND 
BEYOND 13–22 (1995). 
 39. See WILLIAM M. BAUM, UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORISM31–40 (1994). 
 40. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1781. 
 41. Id. at 1775 (“Cognitive neuroscience, by identifying the specific 
mechanisms responsible for behaviour, will vividly illustrate what until now 
could only be appreciated through esoteric theorizing: that there is something 
fishy about our ordinary conceptions of human action and responsibility.”). 
ERICKSON LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  11:40 AM 
38 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 11:1 
 
 
fooled by a belief in goal-directed behavior that we perceive is 
under our control but is entirely the product of forces set into 
motion long before our existence.42 That we may believe that 
we prefer and choose to indulge in chocolate ice-cream over 
vanilla is an illusion; instead, we are a passive audience to the 
electrical cadence of neuronal firings buried deep within our 
heads.43 
But even that view would not be correct according to the 
adherents of the neuroscience model of humanity. As many 
prominent neuroscientists have claimed, there is no “you” as is 
commonly understood: The brain and the mind are 
synonymous.44 As such, the very idea that we are passive 
observers of our determined mind is fallacious. What we 
perceive as the mind is nothing more than a cognitive 
adaptation established by our brains to allow higher-ordered 
behavior.45 That our brains engage in behavior before we 
become consciously aware of it means behavior operates 
independently from our consciousness.46 At the least we are 
                                                          
 42. See id. at 1777. But see LEWIS F. PETRINOVICH, HUMAN EVOLUTION, 
REPRODUCTION, AND MORALITY 112–15 (1995) (discussing problems with 
genetic determinism when applied to evolutionary psychology); Schwartz et 
al., supra note 4, at 1313–15 (2005) (arguing that a strict determinist view of 
behavior is incompatible with quantum physics). 
 43. See Martha J. Farah & Andrea S. Heberlein, Personhood and 
Neuroscience: Naturalizing or Nihilating?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Jan. 2007, at 37, 
40 (“The real contribution of neuroscience to understanding personhood may 
be in revealing not what persons are, but rather why we have the intuition 
that there are persons. . . . [P]ersonhood is illusory, constructed by our brains 
and projected onto the world.”); see generally DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE 
ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 2–28 (2003) (debating the existence of free will 
versus determinism). 
 44. See CRICK, supra note 5, at 3; Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 
17789. 
 45. See COLIN BLAKEMORE, THE MIND MACHINE 270 (1988) (“We feel 
ourselves, usually, to be in control of our actions, but that feeling is itself a 
product of the brain. . . .”). 
 46. This refers to the famous experiment that purported to show that the 
motor cortex is activated several hundreds of milliseconds before subjects 
become aware of their desire to act. Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious 
Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential), 
106 BRAIN 623, 63536 (1983). But see HENRIK WALTER, NEUROPHILOSOPHY 
OF FREE WILL 250–52 (Cynthia Klohr trans., 2001) (discussing criticisms of 
Libet’s interpretation of the experimental findings); Jing Zhu, Reclaiming 
Volition: An Alternative Interpretation of Libet’s Experiment, 10 J. 
CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 61, 67–74 (2003) (providing an alternative 
interpretation of Libet’s results based on artifacts in Libet’s experimental 
design and on the results of experiments by other investigators). 
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fools under the direction of our selfish genes;47 at the worst our 
identity is utterly an illusion.48 The very notion of human 
agencythat people evaluate their environments, make 
choices, and impose those choices in the worldis entirely 
incompatible with the cognitive neuroscience theory of 
personhood.49 And that view has serious implications for 
theories of culpability and responsibility so fundamentally 
rooted in most legal systems. 
The very idea that people are mere passive observers of the 
world in which they occupy is no recent development.50 And 
while most people scoff at the idea that they have little, if any, 
control over their own behavior, Western culture has subtly 
trended towards that idea for many decades. Our modern 
culture is replete with notions of everyday behavior as products 
of addictions and compulsions. The very idea that how people 
think and evaluate the world is influencedoften quite 
stronglyby unconscious biases or motivations is a direct 
descendent of modernity’s infatuation with behavioral science 
explanations of humanity. Irrespective of the veracity of this 
view, it is undeniable that modern culture looks first to 
psychologists and psychiatrists when seeking explanations for 
why people behave badly.51 
Indeed, mental health professionals have made 
tremendous inroads in how most people think about the mind 
and behavior. In many ways, this is beneficial insofar as 
modern society has accommodated the view that people can 
change their unwanted behavior or relinquish their mental 
suffering by seeking professional mental health treatment. 
Likewise, there is a greater understanding that our brains do 
matter in terms of how our minds operate. Those who bear 
substantial brain defects are considered unlucky inhabitants of 
a broken physical body and not the wellspring of malevolent 
                                                          
 47. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE passim (1976). 
 48. See Farah & Heberlein, supra note 43, at 45 (“[P]ersonhood is a kind 
of illusion.”). 
 49. See Steven P.R. Rose, Human Agency in the Neurocentric Age, 6 
EMBO REP. 1001, 1001 (2005). 
 50. For an overview of theory of determinism see Peter Van Inwagen, The 
Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism, 27 PHIL. STUD. 185, 18588 
(1975). 
 51. Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is the numerous expert 
commentaries that are sought by the popular press when a heinous crime is 
committed. See, e.g., Susan Hansen, The Mind of a Killer, SALON, Jul. 27, 
2001, http://www.salon.com/books/int/2001/07/27/killers/. 
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forces or descendents of cruel or indifferent parents.52 Modern 
psychotherapy and biological psychiatry have undoubtedly 
improved the lives of many simply because they offer hope 
through treatment to those whose prognosis decades ago would 
have been very poor. 
But there is a dark side to this fascination with behavioral 
science. As there remains no definitive laboratory test for most 
mental disorders, their presence is assessed solely by 
descriptions written and endorsed by mental health 
professionals. That is, illnesses such as depression or anxiety 
are not diagnosed by a laboratory test of brain pathology, 
rather they are declared so based upon diagnostic descriptions 
of behaviors and reported emotional states.53 Thus, someone is 
diagnosed with clinical depression when she reports feeling sad 
most days, cannot concentrate, and appears to engage in tasks 
with undue torpidity. This process is hardly unusual in 
medicine as many diagnoses begin with a clinical interview of 
reported symptoms by the patient. Yet behavioral science is 
vastly different because in most instances that is where the 
process ends. Despite the promise of bio-markers, genetic 
testing, and brain imaging, mental health practice is nearly 
devoid of these purposed confirmatory tools.54 And while many 
are confident that technology will eventually overcome this 
limitation,55 technology is unlikely to tell us what constitutes a 
normal mind. 
The perennial question of what defines a normal mind 
scarcely constricts the continued encroachment of diagnostic 
labels for an endless number of behaviors and mental states. 
                                                          
 52. Many influential authors during the zenith of psychodynamic thought 
concluded that parental behavior resulted in mental illness in 
childrenincluding psychosis. See, e.g., THEODORE LIDZ ET AL., 
SCHIZOPHRENIA AND THE FAMILY 1519, 42830 (1965). 
 53. A somewhat immoderate version of this thesis was famously 
introduced many decades ago in the wake of revelations that Russian 
psychiatrists often abused the powers of psychiatry to quell political 
dissidents. See THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS 1–15, 62–72 
(1961). 
 54. See Ed Bullmore et al., Why Psychiatry Can’t Afford to be 
Neurophobic, 194 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 293, 295 (2009) (stating that there is 
currently “no clear role for neuroimaging, biomarkers or genetic testing” in 
clinical psychiatry). 
 55. See Peter Tyrer, Civil War Psychiatry, 194 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 386, 
386 (2009) (claiming “in 20 years time it may be very different” in terms of the 
clinical application of neuroimaging, biomarkers, and genetic testing). 
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Over roughly the past fifty years, the number of official 
diagnosable mental disorders has increased by almost 300%.56 
That number will surely grow with the forthcoming fifth 
edition of the official diagnostic manual57aided by the 
contributions of neuroscience.58 Much of this growth can be 
attributed to the classification of behaviors once considered 
indicative of poor character or the willful immoderation of illicit 
passions. Intemperance, pride, and gluttony are no longer 
personal flaws deserving of shame but symptoms of interment-
explosive disorder,59 Narcissistic Personality Disorder,60 and 
the various eating disorders requiring professional treatment.61 
An inappropriate concern with eating healthy foods is now 
indicative of a metal disorder.62 So too, are a host of behaviors 
centered on poor self-control: overuse of the internet,63 
excessive sun-tanning,64 and indulgent cell phone use65 are 
                                                          
 56. See Steven K. Erickson, The Myth of Mental Disorder: 
Transsubstantive Behavior and Taxometric Psychiatry, 41 AKRON L. REV. 67, 
113–14 (2008) 
 57. See Roger K. Blashfield & Kenneth A. Fuller, Predicting the DSM-V, 
184 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 4 (1996) (predicting 1,800 unique 
diagnostic criteria for the new edition based on growth from prior editions). 
 58. See generally Steven E. Hyman, Can Neuroscience Be Integrated into 
the DSM-V?, 8 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 725, 72831 (2007) (arguing 
that neuroscience will and should influence the forthcoming psychiatric 
diagnostic manual). 
 59. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
FOR MENTAL DISORDERS FOURTH EDITION: TEXT REVISION 663–67 (4th ed. 
2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV REVISION]. 
 60. Id. at 714–17. 
 61. Id. at 583–95. 
 62. See L. M. Donini et al., Orthorexia Nervosa: A Preliminary Study With 
a Proposal for Diagnosis and an Attempt to Measure the Dimension of the 
Phenomenon, 9 EATING & WEIGHT DISORDERS 151, 151 (2004). 
 63. See Jerald J. Block, Issues for DSM-V: Internet Addiction, 165 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 306 (2008) (arguing that internet addiction is associated with 
tolerance and withdrawal symptoms and that it should be included in DSM-
V). But see Nicki A. Dowling & Kelly L. Quirk, Screening for Internet 
Dependence: Do the Proposed Diagnostic Criteria Differentiate Normal from 
Dependent Internet Use?, 12 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 21, 22 (2009) 
(suggesting that current methods for diagnosing internet addiction do not 
discriminate normal from abnormal users). 
 64. See Molly M. Warthan et al., UV Light Tanning as a Type of 
Substance-Related Disorder, 141 ARCHIVES DERMATOLOGY 963, 965 (2005) 
(arguing that excessive sunbathing is an addiction and should be regulated by 
the law). 
 65. See Lauren D. LaPorta, Cellular Telephones: A New Addiction?, 
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, 
http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/display/article/10168/52076?pageNumber=1. 
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considered forms of addictions necessitating inventions by 
mental health professionals. Very few people escape the 
increasing reach of psychiatric diagnostic classification. In a 
few short decades, we all have become mentally unsound. 
B.  THE WAY OF COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 
Cognitive neuroscience can be defined as an investigative 
field that seeks to understand how the mind arises from the 
central nervous system, in particular the brain.66 It bridges the 
fields of cognitive science, psychology, and biology by focusing 
on the biological mechanisms underlying cognition, with a 
specific focus on the neural substrates of mental processes and 
their behavioral manifestations.67 It claims to answer how 
psychological and cognitive capacities are produced by the 
structure and function of neural networks within primates.68 It 
is premised on the idea that all aspects of mentation are 
entirely reducible to material terms and these elements are 
measurable in ways that provide meaningful insights into the 
origin of behaviors.69 It assumes that measured brain states 
can be used not only to understand how brain activity becomes 
behavior, but that such information can be generalized across 
all brains to arrive at a unified understanding of human 
mentation.70 To put it differently, cognitive neuroscience 
asserts that all individual thoughts, emotions, and feelings can 
be traced to certain defined biological locations of the brain.71 
Moreover, these measurements can be used to discern how all 
brains operate and how to build models which predict future 
mental activity and behavior.72 
It is hard to imagine the domain of cognitive neuroscience 
without reference to the various brain imaging technologies 
                                                          
 66. See HOWARD S. KIRSHNER, BEHAVIORAL NEUROLOGY 5 (2d ed. 2002). 
 67. See id. at 45. 
 68. See generally David Wells, Book Review, 122 BRAIN 2413 passim 
(1999) (reviewing RANDOLPH W. PARKS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF NEURAL 
NETWORK MODELING: NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 
(1999)) (overviewing a textbook that explains neural network modeling). 
 69. See Martha J. Farah, Neuroethics: The Practical and the 
Philosophical, 9 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 34, 34 (2005). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 38. 
 72. Id. 
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that it so frequently utilizes to arrive at its conclusions.73 These 
technologies have greatly enhanced the ability of scientists to 
investigate the structure and function of the living brain. The 
principal technology that cognitive neuroscience uses is 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which began to 
dominate the field of brain mapping during the 1990s.74 Like 
its predecessor, structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), 
fMRI uses a powerful magnetic field known as Larmor 
precession to affect the water molecules within cells.75 While 
the technical details of brain imaging are beyond the scope of 
this article, the key difference between structural and 
functional MRI lies in what they purport to measure and 
explain. As its name implies, structural MRI provides images of 
brain structure, that is, how the brain is organized by its 
constituent parts.76 The pictures provided by structural MRI 
conform to what is understood about how the brain is 
constructed and organized when it is dissected at autopsy.77 
The chief advantage of structural MRI is, of course, that it 
provides an examination of structure inside living brains. In 
contrast, functional MRI claims to show how brains function 
and work.78 As such, the latter imposes two significant 
assumptions absent from the former. First, since there are no 
definitive or universal rules about how the brain becomes the 
mind,79 fMRI utilizes technologically convenient assumptions 
about brain function to arrive at its end product.80 Second, 
there are no alternative mechanisms equivalent to autopsy 
                                                          
 73. For example, a recent review discovered approximately 19,000 peer-
reviewed articles involving fMRI technology since 1991, corresponding to over 
three papers per day. Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and What We 
Cannot Do with fMRI, 453 NATURE 869, 869 (2008). 
 74. See id. 
 75. RAY H. HASHEMI, ET AL., MRI: THE BASICS 26 (2003). 
 76. See DONALD W. MCROBBIE ET AL., MRI: FROM PICTURE TO PROTON 1 
(2003). 
 77. See id. 
 78. MCROBBIE ET AL., supra note 76, at 333. 
 79. See Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: 
Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neuroscience, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. 1, 20 (2008) (“We do not know how the brain enables the mind . . . .”); 
UTTAL, supra note 21, at 27 (“The mind, however difficult it may be to define, 
is widely agreed to be the outcome of complex information processing 
associated with the brain . . . . [M]ost scientists and philosophers also agree 
that how this is accomplished remains mysterious and unknown.”). 
 80. WILLIAM R. UTTAL, THE NEW PHRENOLOGY: THE LIMITS OF 
LOCALIZING COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN THE BRAIN 136 (2001) [hereinafter 
UTTAL, LOCALIZING]. 
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dissection to validate the findings of fMRI. Hence, it remains 
difficult, if not impossible, to replicate fMRI findings outside of 
the purview of the brain imaging machine. Thus, there is a leap 
of faith built into the brain imaging framework when we accept 
its conclusions regarding the operations of the mind. Since 
cognitive neuroscience is ultimately interested in how the mind 
operates through the brain,81 the assumptions built into the 
fMRI model matter immensely as fMRI is the workhorse of the 
field. 
A fundamental attribute of the fMRI technique holds that 
understanding the complexity of mentation is possible by 
reducing the operation of the brain to multiple quasi-
independent cognitive modules.82 For instance, sight is 
assigned to regions of the brain believed responsible for 
generating and regulating vision, bodily movement to areas 
involved with motor control, and so forth.83 Consequently, when 
researchers want to explore how people see something, they 
examine those parts of the brain which are believed involved 
with sight and usually exclude other regions of the brain. The 
images produced by the fMRI technique rest upon the notion 
that subtracting fMRI data at different time points from areas 
of the brain presumed to be involved with particular elements 
of thinking and behavior reveals meaningful differences 
between brain states that conveys valuable information about 
human mentation.84 That is, functional brain imaging concerns 
                                                          
 81. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1781 (“There are many causes 
that impinge on behaviour, but all of them—from the genes you inherited, to 
the pain in your lower back, to the advice your grandmother gave you when 
you were six—must exert their influence though the brain.”). 
 82. Known as “localization,” this theory is the backbone of cognitive 
neuroscience and holds that mental functions are carried out by particular 
brain structures. See EDWIN CLARKE ET AL., The Genesis of Cortical 
Localization, in AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF BRAIN FUNCTION 115, 11528 
(1996); cf. WILLIAM R. UTTAL, NEURAL THEORIES OF MIND 116 (2005) 
[hereinafter UTTAL THEORIES] (“On the psychological side, it is not at all 
certain that cognitive modules exist.”); Logothetis, supra note 73, at 869 (“[A] 
frequently made assumption is that the mind can be subdivided into modules 
or parts whose activity can then be studied with fMRI. If this assumption is 
false, then even if the brain’s architecture is modular, we would never be able 
to map mind modules onto brain structures . . . .”). 
 83. JOSEPH E. LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS 
UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 7677 (1996). 
 84. Brain imaging uses the technique of generating differences between 
groups by subtracting brain activation patterns to arrive at its conclusion of 
individual differences. For an overview, see Matthew B. Crawford, The Limits 
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itself with the idea that areas of the brain that consume more 
oxygenated blood than others do while performing a task 
discloses how people think.85 This theory of brain activity is 
harmonious with the structural conception of the brain 
whereby different areas of the brain control different activities. 
Thus, the frontal lobe of the brain is considered involved with 
conscious thought,86 the temporal lobe with smell87 and sound, 
and the pituitary with hormone regulation.88 Modern 
neuroscience arrived at this global understanding of brain 
function mainly by observing functional and behavioral deficits 
among those with brain injury.89 Those who, for instance, suffer 
from traumatic damage to the occipital lobe frequently endure 
visual impairments, including hallucinations or even 
blindness.90 
When neuroscience explores functions such as sight, smell, 
or motor coordination, it operates under the reasonable 
assumption that outward behavior is the product of brain 
activity controlled by specific regions of the brain. But the chief 
interest of cognitive neuroscience lies beyond observable 
behavior. Instead of explaining behavior, cognitive 
neuroscience seeks to understand how people think. To 
accomplish this feat, it must employ experiments which assume 
                                                          
of Neuro-Talk, 19 NEW ATLANTIS, Winter 2008, at 65, 70-72. These group 
differences often obscure tremendous variations among the individual 
subjects. See Michael B. Miller et al., Extensive Individual Differences in Brain 
Activations Associated with Episodic Retrieval Are Reliable over Time, 14 J. 
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1200, 120911 (2002). Additionally, the 
calculations used with this technique have recently been criticized for 
generating inflated estimates of significance. See Edward Vul et al., Puzzlingly 
High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and Social 
Cognition, 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 274 passim (2009); Nikolaus 
Kriegeskorte et al., Circular Analysis in Systems Neuroscience: The Dangers of 
Double Dipping, 12 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 535 passim (2009). 
 85. It is worth noting that only recently was it discovered that cells in the 
brain were responsible for the increased blood flow measured by fMRI. See 
James Schummers et al., Turned Responses of Astrocytes and Their Influence 
on Hemodynamic Signals in the Visual Cortex, 320 SCI 1638 (2008). 
 86. KIRSHNER, supra note 66, at 2223. 
 87. EVIAN GORDON, INTEGRATIVE NEUROSCIENCE: BRINGING TOGETER 
BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CLINICAL MODELS OF THE HUMAN BRAIN 
182 (2000). 
 88. Marianne B. Müller et al., Genetics of Endocrine—Behavior 
Interactions, in 5 HORMONES, BRAIN, AND BEHAVIOR 263 (Donald W. Pfaff ed., 
2002). 
 89. See GORDON, supra note 87. 
 90. See ORRIN DEVINSKY & MARK D’ESPOSITO, NEUROLOGY OF COGNITIVE 
AND BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS 13238 (2004). 
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that complex human thoughts are reducible to independent 
modules located in specific areas of the brain.91 Thus, cognitive 
neuroscience claims that when one is faced with an important 
moral dilemma, such as whether to pull a lever to divert a 
trolley car and save many lives at the expense of killing 
another,92 how one thinks about such morally impinged 
matters can be entirely understood by examining brain activity 
in certain sections of the brain.93 Yet this approach assumes 
that such complex thoughts are accessible and readily 
explained by the technology employed by the neuroscientist. 
Determining which areas of the brain are responsible for such 
higher-ordered, and presumably uniquely human mentation, is 
largely a matter of reliance on three factors: (1) anecdotal 
evidence from brain injury victims, (2) observations of people 
under the effects of psychoactive chemicals, (3) and highly-
contrived experiments conducted within the confines of fMRI 
laboratories. 
1.  Reduction and Deduction 
Anecdotal evidence of brain function related to higher 
cognitive processes comes from retrospective studies that link 
severe and substantial brain damage to observed behavior.94 
Perhaps the most famous example of this phenomenon was the 
nineteenth century case of Phineas Gage, a law-abiding railway 
                                                          
 91. See UTTAL, LOCALIZING, supra note 80, at 99110; see also Daniel T. 
Willingham & Elizabeth W. Dunn, What Neuroimaging and Brain 
Localization Can Do, Cannot Do, and Should Not Do for Social Psychology, 85 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 662, 66768 (2003) (describing the difficulty 
of localizing social psychology constructs). 
 92. This, of course, refers to the legendary trolley car dilemma. See 
PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHIL. 19, 
2024 (1978); see also Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L. 
J. 1395 passim (1985) (providing an extended discussion of the dilemma); 
Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in 
Moral Judgment, 293 SCI. 2105 passim (2001) (investigating emotional 
processing areas of the brain using the trolley car dilemma and fMRI). 
 93. Cf.Steven Pinker, The Moral Instinct, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 13, 2008, 
at 3234 (“The human moral sense turns out to be an organ of considerable 
complexity, with quirks that reflect its evolutionary history and its 
neurobiological foundations.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Thomas C. Neylan, Frontal Lobe Function: Mr. Phineas 
Gage’s Famous Injury, 11 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 
280, 280 (1999) (explaining how a physician used Phineas Gage’s injury and 
reported personality changes to advance the idea of cerebral localization in the 
1800s). 
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worker who suffered a severe brain injury when an iron 
tapping rod was driven though a large portion of his frontal 
lobes.95 After the accident, Gage’s behavior was erratic and 
callous; friends who knew him noted his changed personality 
despite his largely preserved cognitive abilities.96 Gage’s injury 
in many ways was a watershed moment in medicine. It prodded 
a skeptical medical community to conclude that personality, 
behavior, and the brain were inextricably linked.97 It also 
hastened the view that intrinsic elements of personality and 
behavior were localized within discrete areas of the brain and 
laid open the possibility that surgical intervention could 
radically alter sensation, perception, behaviorand 
presumably thoughts as well.98 The hunt for connections 
between brain regions and defined behavior was launched; and 
that pursuit continues with vigor to this day.99 
Much like the discoveries surrounding Phineas Gage, 
serendipity played a large role in revealing how psychoactive 
chemicals affect behavior. From the late nineteenth century 
through the 1930s, a number of French and German scientists 
were searching for new types of dyes to stain slides for 
microscopes.100 These phenothiazine dyes were noted for their 
various medicinal properties, including the treatment of 
malaria during World War I, when the traditional quinine 
treatment became unavailable due to military blockades.101 In 
the 1930s, phenothiazines were explored for their possible 
antihistaminic properties in an effort to discover new 
treatments for surgical shock.102 After several formulations, the 
                                                          
 95. James M. Harlow, Letter to the Editor, Passage of an Iron Bar 
Through the Head, 39 BOSTON MED. & SURGICAL J. 38993 (1848), reprinted in 
11 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 281, 28183 (1999). 
 96. See Neylan, supra note 94. 
 97. See MALCOLM MACMILLAN, AN ODD KIND OF FAME 4145 (2002). 
 98. Id. at 12542, 20550. As might be expected, the lobotomy procedure 
was a direct descendent of this insight into brains, behavior and surgical 
intercession. See Robert P. Feldman & James T. Goodrich, Psychosurgery: A 
Historical Overview, 48 NEUROSURGERY 647, 64954 (2001). 
 99. See Logothetis, supra note 73, at 869, 870 (claiming that about half of 
the 19,000 peer-reviewed papers utilizing fMRI technology explored 
“functional localization,” of which many used lower powered fMRI magnets 
prone to “localization errors”). 
 100. See Francisco López-Muñoz et al., History of the Discovery and 
Clinical Introduction of Chlorpromazine, 17 ANNALS OF CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 
113, 114 (2005). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 116. 
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drug chlorpromazine was discovered and used in surgery by a 
French army surgeon named Henri-Marie Lamborit.103 
Lamborit noted that chlorpromazine was a highly effective 
sedative and soon suggested to his psychiatric colleagues that 
they try it with psychiatric patients.104 Its effect was 
monumental. Chlorpromazine would become the first effective 
psychiatric medicine and was largely responsible for the 
massive decline of institutional state asylums during the 
1960s.105 Exploring the mechanisms behind chlorpromazine 
and similar drugs led to understanding that 
neurotransmittersthe chemical messengers of neural 
tissuecan be affected by drugs to produce profound 
behavioral changes in people.106 Those changes can both 
produce beneficial and horrific behaviors and suggest that 
behavior is directly linked with the chemistry of the brain. 
Those effects also imply that behavior results from the actions 
of neural mechanisms within defined regions of the brain. 
The spate of brain imaging studies that claim to identify 
regions of the brain responsible for character, love, morality, 
and other human attributes also rely upon the premise that 
localized areas of the brain are responsible for human 
behaviors.107 Many of these studies depend on comparisons 
between people with known brain injuries and those with no 
record or indication of brain injury. For instance, numerous 
studies have suggested that one areathe ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPC)is predominantly responsible for 
moral behavior in humans.108 These studies draw their 
conclusions by having subjects engage in simplified tasks or 
merely having them observe visual stimuli within the housing 
of the fMRI machine. For instance, one typical study asked 
subjects to choose between two given alternatives in a series of 
                                                          
 103. Id. at 11626. 
 104. Id. at 118. 
 105. See id. at 128. 
 106. See Solomon H. Snyder et al., Drugs, Neurotransmitters, and 
Schizophrenia, 184 SCI. 1243 (1974). 
 107. See Martha J. Farah & Nancy Murphy, Neuroscience and the Soul, 
323 SCI. 1168, 1168 (2009) (“[A]s neuroscience begins to reveal the 
mechanisms underlying personality, love, morality, and spiritualty, the idea of 
a ghost in the machine becomes strained. Brain imaging indicates that all of 
these traits have physical correlates in brain function.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Michael Koenigs et al., Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex 
Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgments, 446 NATURE 908, 90810 (2007). 
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hypothetical moral dilemmas.109 The type of dilemmas used in 
these studies range from choosing environmental polices based 
on mortality calculations to cheating on one’s taxes, to 
smothering a crying baby to prevent discovery of a group of 
people hiding from enemy soldiers.110 Another study scanned 
subjects’ brains while they observed emotionally laden facial 
features projected on to a television screen inside the fMRI 
apparatus.111 Still another study examined probabilistic 
judgments in children assessed as having psychopathic traits 
while scanning their brains.112 While the methods of these 
studies differ, all of the studies claim to link impaired moral 
judgment and emotional regulation based on differences in 
purported measured brain activity. Moreover, they all propose 
that the results generated by these tightly controlled studies, 
which take place in the unnatural environment of the fMRI 
machine, elucidate more generally how people behave in the 
world under the demands of everyday life.113 Despite the small 
sample sizes used in these studies, primarily ranging from ten 
to twenty subjects,114 supporters ardently suggest that these 
differences in brain activity demonstrate the root origin of 
behavior and thought.115 Thus, moral thinking and behavior is 
                                                          
 109. Id. at 108. 
 110. See Joshua D. Greene et al., Supplement Data: The Neural Bases of 
Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment, 14 NEURON S1, S34 
(2004), http://download.cell.com/neuron/mmcs/journals/0896-
6273/PIIS0896627304006348.mmc1.pdf 
 111. See Andrea S. Heberlein et al., Ventromedial Frontal Lobe Plays a 
Critical Role in Facial Emotion Recognition, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 721, 
72324 (2008). 
 112. See Elizabeth C. Finger et al., Abnormal Ventromedial Prefrontal 
Cortex Function in Children with Psychopathic Traits During Reversal 
Learning, 65 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 586, 587–89 (2008). 
 113. See generally Andrew Scull, Minds, Brains, Law, and Culture, 130 
BRAIN 585, 589 (2007) (book review) (“[J]ust as economists traditionally rely 
upon absurdly oversimplified portraits of human motivation to construct their 
models, so all the neuroscientific findings that are so proudly proffered reflect 
simple simulated experiments that in no way capture the intricacies of 
everyday social situations . . . .”). 
 114. A recent commentary suggests that these small sample sizes greatly 
inflate the statistical findings in these studies. See Tal Yarkoni, Big 
Correlations in Little Studies: Inflated fMRI Correlations Reflect Low 
Statistical Power—Commentary on Vul et al. (2009), 4 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 294 passim (2009). 
 115. But see Greg Miller, Growing Pains for fMRI, 320 SCI. 1412, 1413 
(2008) (reviewing criticisms of the moral dilemma fMRI studies and noting 
that “some of the ‘emotional’ brain regions in the morality study have also 
been connected to memory and language—a caveat that is rarely mentioned in 
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merely a product of neuronal discharges inside the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex of the brainand nothing 
more.116 They are, as two preeminent neuroscientists put it 
recently, “not mere correlates but are the physical bases of 
these aspects of our personhood.”117 
2.  The Life of the Brain 
The evidence that neuroscience marshals in favor of its 
explanation of higher-ordered behavior is striking. Few would 
seriously contend that modern understandings of behavior have 
not advanced immensely by examining the principal proxy of 
behavior which is the brain. Yet the relationship between 
brains, behavior, and minds is highly intimate and masked.118 
It is not at all clear that mentation can be reduced in any 
meaningful fashion by merely describing the activation 
patterns of neuronal tissue.119 While neuroscientists would 
                                                          
media coverage . . . .”). 
 116. The proponents of this neurocentric view suggest these findings are 
fundamentally important when examining normative ethics as well. See, e.g., 
Joshua Greene, From Neural ‘Is’ to Moral ‘Ought’: What Are the Moral 
Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?, 4 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCI. 
847, 847 (2003) (“[S]cientific facts can have profound moral implications 
and . . . moral philosophers have paid too little attention to relevant work in 
the natural sciences.”). 
 117. Farah & Murphy, supra note 107, at 1168. 
 118. As Nobel prize winning scientist Max Delbrück put it in a quote 
loosely attributed to him: “So far as I can tell, our science simply has no 
handle whatever on the most conspicuous and immediate reality of our lives: 
that we are aware.” See MAX DELBRÜCK, MIND FROM MATTER? 159 (1986). 
“When I was a student in Gödttingen, there appeared a story in the 
newspaper about a rabbit that had been frozen and then brought back 
to life. Although the report of this cryogenic feat was probably a 
sensationalist fabrication, someone was inspired by this story to ask 
various people what they would ask about if they had been frozen for 
500 years and then revived.” My own priorities come to mind with 
crashing immediacy: “Has a machine yet been made that has 
awareness, a synthetic consciousness? Is there any agreed-upon way 
yet to detect and measure the quality, or even the existence, of an 
object’s consciousness?” 
Id. 
 119. See Scull, supra note 113, at 589. 
Much is made of the fact that particular regions of the brain show 
heightened levels of activity on fMRIs when people, for example, are 
making choices, or telling lies. . . . [S]uch correlations prove nothing 
about the causal process involved, any more than . . . the existence of 
a particular sequence of events demonstrates that some early event in 
the sequence ineluctably caused the a later event. Post hoc ergo 
propter hoc is an elementary logical fallacy. 
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have us believe that their brain activity measurements equate 
an adequate and sufficient detailing of the mind, the 
impressive images upon which their persuasion relies runs 
counter to the tremendous complexity of brain anatomy and 
function. “With 1010 neurons and 1014 connections in the 
[human] cortex alone,” the human brain defies any simple 
mechanical explanation.120 Much of the workings of the brain 
are breathtakingly beautiful, mysterious, and continue to 
confound researchers despite their dogged attempts to dissect 
and translate its processes. Even the technology used to 
generate functional brain images remains clouded in obscurity, 
as many of the fundamental technicalities remain poorly 
understood.121 
More importantly, the underlying cognitive processes and 
mechanisms which cognitive neuroscience seeks to explain are 
neither directly observable nor measurable. That is, mentation 
is not measured by the neuroscientist; brain activity is.122 As 
such, when the neuroscientist claims to measure “moral 
thinking,” what is measured are regions of brain activation 
believed to be associated with thinking about moral problems. 
But in describing that process, neuroscience has not yet 
explained how molecular brain activity becomes thoughts about 
morality. It is not as though neuroscience has any instrument 
known as a “moral thought” aperture. Instead, it has 
sophisticated tools which measure the proxy of thoughts, which 
is brain activity. Putting aside the endless debate of dualism 
between mind and brain, what matters in terms of 
understanding cognitive neuroscience’s many claims 
surrounding measured mentation is the simple fact that, as of 
yet, we have no idea how the brain becomes the mind.123 
Describing brain molecular activity does little to advance that 
understanding.124 At the most, brain imaging tells us what 
                                                          
Id. 
 120. See Logothetis, supra note 73, at 87172. 
 121. A number of articles have illuminated the limitations of fMRI 
technologies, ranging from measurement and the physiology of the brain to 
statistical analysis of the data to the underlying scientific assumptions used. 
See e.g., id. passim; Vul, supra note 84 passim. 
 122. See, e.g., Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1310 (“[T]erms such as 
‘feeling,’ ‘knowing,’ and ‘effort,’ because they are intrinsically mentalistic and 
experiential, cannot be described exclusively in terms of material structure.”). 
 123. See Morse, supra note 79, at 20. 
 124. Cf. Rose, supra note 49, at 1004 (“Research over many decades has 
produced an account of the molecular cascade occurring during memory 
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chemical and molecular patterns emerge from the brain when 
engaged in a task. As such, it describes forms of brain activity; 
but those contours of chemical variation do not explain why 
people think pushing someone into the path of a trolley car is 
immoral. To say an area of the brain is activated in some 
people when faced with this morally fraught dilemma only 
exposes the fact that cognitive neuroscience defines its relevant 
explanations by the technology it employs.125 And that 
technology operates under assumptions and limitations which 
circumscribe its explanations. 
Likewise, cognitive neuroscientists conveniently ignore 
evidence that brains operate in a fashion opposed to the 
strictures of brain imaging technology. Brain activation and 
localization betray the essential truth that when brains are 
engaged in a task, the entire brain is activated.126 The localized 
areas of activation which are prominently displayed in pages of 
most neuroscience journals are based on the premise that 
subtracting activation images between groups reveals distinct 
brain regions responsible for the thoughts and behaviors in 
question.127 And while it is understood that certain brain 
regions are necessary and crucial for defined behaviorssuch 
as the motor cortex for movementthose observations in no 
way tell us which areas are sufficiently responsible for thinking 
about running down to the store for a pint of milk, much less 
proscribed acts of predation. To assert that a brain function, 
such as visual attention, seems involved with the visual and 
parietal lobes of the brain128 fails to elucidate how the mind is 
engaged when looking at the works of Cezanne, Rubens, or 
                                                          
formation. However, this summary does not explain the memory, it merely 
describes the brain events involved in making it.”). 
 125. See Logothetis, supra note 73, at 869 (“[L]ike all haemodynamic-based 
modalities, [fMRI] measures a surrogate signal whose spatial specificity and 
temporal response are subject to both physical and biological constraints.”). 
 126. See Crawford, supra note 84, at 70 
In the case of functional (as opposed to structural) neuroimaging, 
what you are seeing when you look at a brain scan is the result of a 
subtraction. . . . One . . . problem is that this method eliminates from 
the picture the more massive fact, which is that the entire brain is 
active in both conditions. 
Id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See, e.g., Jody C. Culham et al., Attention Response Functions: 
Characterizing Brain Areas Using fMRI Activation During Parametric 
Variations of Attentional Load, 32 NEURON 737, 742 (2001). 
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even a blank sheet of paper. As psychologist William Uttal 
notes: 
Is it a “stuff” that can be divided, allocated, and focused and that is 
available only in limited amounts, and thus can be localized in a 
particular part of the brain? Or, to the contrary, is it an attribute or 
characteristic of perception . . . inseparable as the diameter or 
whiteness of a golf ball is from the physical ball itself? . . . It seems 
plausible that many of the psychological components or modules we 
seek to locate in a particular region of the brain should likewise be 
thought of as properties of a unified mental “object” rather than as 
analyzable and isolatable entities.129 
 What Uttal suggests is what emerging neuroscience 
evidence reveals to be so: that the brain is a highly distributed 
system with millions of connections at play in any given 
moment.130 As such, how people think about matters of love, 
jealously, and morality entails understanding how thoughts, 
behavior, and the brain are highly interwoven. While brain 
imaging experimentsand particularly the interpretations 
derived from their resultsoften assert that thinking and 
human behavior are merely the end products of determined 
brain functions, other evidence suggests the human mind is 
much more than this automated view. 
 One of the key insights provided by neuroscience entails 
the dynamic nature of the brain. While it was once assumed 
that adult brain structure was static and mostly unaltered by 
the environment and behavior itself, it has been firmly 
established that this is not the case.131 It is now known that the 
brain is constantly in flux, with its structure and function 
ceaselessly molded by environmental influences.132 Among 
these environmental influences is thought itself, which has the 
propensity to alter a wide-range of brain structures and 
functions ranging from perception of sensory stimuli to higher-
                                                          
 129. UTTAL LOCALIZING, supra note 80; cf. Crawford, supra note 84, at 
6769 (dissenting from Uttal’s description of attention as “stuff” by noting that 
most neuroscientists define attention as a function but “this correction does 
not vacate the force of Uttal’s criticism, because functions, like properties, are 
distributed . . . .”). 
 130. See Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Law and Neuroscience, 60 NEURON 
412, 413 (2008) (“The brain is a highly parallel and distributed system with 
literally millions of decisions being made simultaneously.”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Peter Vestergaard-Poulsen et al., Long-Term Meditation Is Associated 
with Increased Gray Matter Density in the Brain Stem, 20 NEUROREPORT 170 
(2009) (reporting changes in neuronal cell bodies among those who engage in 
sustained attention activities). 
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ordered behavior.133 For instance, several studies have 
demonstrated that psychological therapies which center on 
having patients change their thinking about certain 
problematic behaviors produces significant changes in cerebral 
metabolism, neuronal structure, and regional brain function.134 
These studies suggest that thoughts can alter brain structure 
and function inasmuch as the reverse may do so. To put it 
differently, the mental phenomenon which is only indirectly 
measured in the brain imaging paradigm by examining proxies 
of neuronal activity may very well exert independent effects 
upon the neuronal activity itself. As it was recently put by a 
group of prominent neuroscientists: 
[T]he assumption that all aspects of mental activity and emotional life 
are ultimately explicable solely in terms of micro-local deterministic 
brain activity, with no superposed effects of mental effort, produces a 
theoretical structure that both fails to meet practical scientific needs, 
and also fails to accord with the causal structure of modern 
physics.135 
Yet discussions of law and neuroscience are nearly devoid 
of this vital aspect of brain physiology. The general thesis 
employed by those who wish to advance neuroscience within 
criminal law suggest that abnormal brain function is indicative 
of an agent wholly at the mercy of his aberrant and determined 
brain activity.136 These hapless citizens are said to be in no way 
responsible for their illicit behavior in the same way that a ball 
is not responsible for rolling down a hill.137 The determined 
forces operating on the behavior of the ball and the person 
                                                          
 133. See Antoine Lutz et al., Long-Term Mediators Self-Induce High-
Amplitude Gamma Synchrony During Mental Practice, 46 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. 1637172 (2004) (describing how mental training can produce short-term 
and long-term neural changes); Vestergaard-Poulsen, et al., supra note 132. 
 134. See Vincent Paquette et al., “Change the Mind and You Change the 
Brain”: Effects of Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy on the Neural Correlates of 
Spider Phobia, 18 NEUROIMAGE 401, 40607 (2003) (reporting psychotherapy 
modified dysfunctional neuronal structure and function among those with 
diagnosed anxiety disorders). 
 135. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1312. 
 136. Greene and Cohen make this familiar argument using their example 
of Mr. Puppet, a person biologically designed with a predilection towards 
violence and vice. They conclude “in a very real sense, we are all puppets. The 
combined effects of our genes and environment determine all of our 
actions . . . . We are no more free than he is.” Greene & Cohen supra note 3 at, 
1780. 
 137. Id. at 1779. 
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plunging a knife into his wife’s chest are one in the same.138 
Both are helpless in avoiding their fates disposed by the 
material forces at work set in motion outside of their 
consciousness.139 Indeed, it is not just those with broken brains 
who reside in this stark illusion of personhood, but all of 
humanity.140 
III.  NEUROLAW’S SECRET AMBITION 
The law cares much about causation. Whether in the arena 
of elaborate regulation or intrinsic rules proscribing harm to 
others, scarcely any law exists without the idea that breach of a 
law involves action (or omission) by an agent. From this simple 
premise flows the notion of culpability. Western legal systems 
rest on the assumption that people, acting as agents of their 
own behavior (at the very least) are responsible for their 
decisions and behaviors.141 The law justifiably holds those who 
violate rules as blameworthy and responsible since it is 
presumed within most legal codes that people are responsible 
for their actions.142 
It can be fairly said that an elementary reason why people 
obey the law is because the system of rules embodied within it 
follows the ordinary intuitions of how behavior should be 
                                                          
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1777 (“[A] deterministic universe starts however it starts and 
then ticks along like clockwork from there . . . . [Y]our sense of yourself and 
others as having free will is an illusion.”). 
 140. Id. at 1775 (suggesting that neuroscience will reveal “there is 
something fishy about our ordinary conceptions of human action and 
responsibility . . . .”). 
 141. As it was famously put by Hale: 
Man is naturally endowed with these two great faculties, 
understanding and liberty of will, and therefore is subjected properly 
capable of a law properly so called, and consequently obnoxious to 
guilt and punishment for the violation of that law, which in respect of 
these two great faculties he has a capacity to obey. The consent of the 
will is that, which renders human actions either commendable or 
culpable, as there is no law there is no transgressions, so regularly 
there is no will to commit an offense, there can be no transgression or 
just reason to incur the penalty. 
1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 14–15 (1986); see also Smith v. Armontrout, 865 
F.2d 1502, 1506 (1988) (“The whole presupposition of the criminal law is that 
most people, most of the time, have free will within broad limits.”). 
 142. See HLA HART & A.M. HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 59 (1959) (“In 
the moral judgments of ordinary life, we have occasion to blame people 
because they have caused harm to others . . . in all legal systems, liability to be 
punished . . . depends on whether actions (or omissions) have caused harm.”). 
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regulated in everyday life.143 Those intuitions are firmly rooted 
within the social view that people evaluate their environments, 
make choices, and impose those choices to the best of their 
ability on the world.144 The law has long recognized that those 
who are unable to make choices or operate under extreme 
duress at the time they make a choice are not legally culpable 
agents.145 Thus, incapacitated people cannot commit to 
contracts as well as those who commit crimes when under the 
immediate threat of death from another are not held 
responsible for their behavior.146 
In many ways, agency is the crucible of law and humanity. 
The power of law is derived from the near universal belief that 
people can be persuaded in some fashion to abide by its dictates 
or suffer punishment for failure to do so.147 Irrespective of 
whether the law is inherently just or overly oppressive, law 
operates to influence behavior and the choices of those who live 
under its regime.148 While scholars may debate the essence of 
justice and mercy, Western legal conceptions of these elements 
derive in large measure from the idea that people choose and 
intend their behavior most of the time.149 To undo agency risks 
                                                          
 143. See Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the 
Layperson Thinks is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 1839, 1861 (2000). Even fervent neurolaw supporters admit as much. See 
Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1778 (“The legitimacy of the law itself 
depends on its adequately reflecting the moral intuitions and commitments of 
society.”). 
 144. See United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 994 (1984) (“An adjudication 
of guilt is more than a factual determination that the defendant pulled a 
trigger, took a bicycle, or sold heroin. It is a moral judgment that the 
individual is blameworthy.”); Alan R. Felthous, The Will: From Metaphysical 
Freedom to Normative Functionalism, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 16, 16 
(2008) (“It is widely assumed that people have a relatively unhindered 
capacity to make choices and to decide what they will do.”); Sousa, supra note 
36, at 11 (recounting study results that a majority of respondents thought a 
universe of indeterministic choice was most like ours). 
 145. See Farah, supra note 69, at 38. 
 146. Id. 
 147. PAUL M. SNIDERMAN ET AL., REASONING AND CHOICE: EXPLORATIONS 
IN POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1991). 
 148. Id. 
 149. The idea that an act cannot entail blame without a guilty mind is 
often said to be the cornerstone of modern criminal law. See Duncan v. State, 
26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 148, 150 (“It is a sacred principle of criminal jurisprudence 
that the intention to commit the crime is of the essence of the crime . . . .”); see 
generally Albert Levitt, The Origins of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 117 passim (1922) (describing the influence of ecclesiastical law on 
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undoing the very heart of how law operates and the connection 
between law and the people it governs. 
But neurolaw’s promise to reveal why people think and 
behave as they do is inescapably built on the idea that people 
are not agents as the law traditionally views them. Instead, 
they are guided almost entirely by determined and unconscious 
chemical cascades which exert irresistible control over an 
agent’s thinking and behavior. What is needed is not blame and 
punishment but therapeutic interventions formulated by 
science which can control and mitigate future harm. A 
neurolaw informed criminal justice policy sees criminal 
behavior as the result of abnormal brain processes, not the 
exercise of willful choice by free agents. What matters is not 
whether those agents knew that their behavior was wrong, but 
whether they can control it in the future. And understanding 
whether an agent has the ability to do so rests entirely under 
the expertise of science, not judges or juries. Neurolaw seeks 
not just to inform the law, but also to impose its supremacy in 
crafting policy. It begins this endeavor by undoing the 
distinction between the criminal and civil code. 
A.  MAKING THE CRIMINAL, CIVIL 
Criminal law proscribes conduct. Yet most criminal 
statutes begin their proscriptions not with behavior but with 
mental states.150 Modern criminal law goes to great lengths to 
differentiate between those who intend their illicit conduct 
from those who fail to exercise prudence even if the conduct 
produces the same result. The difference between murder and 
manslaughter generally falls not on the end result of the 
agent’s behavior but her mental state at the time of the offense. 
Thus, criminal law follows ordinary intuition which hold that 
death caused by the intentional or malicious conduct of a 
defendant should be treated very differently than when it is 
caused by reckless or careless behavior. It is from this common 
intuition that mercy and mitigation flow.151 Even when agents 
                                                          
modern Western legal codes which emphasized the mental state in 
determining blameworthiness). 
 150. Cf. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 70 (2d ed. 
1960) (“The principle of mens rea is the ultimate evaluation of criminal 
conduct and, because of that, it is deeply involved in theories of punishment.”). 
 151. See O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital 
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 130912(2007) (describing the nexus 
between retribution, mitigation, and intuition). 
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engage in intentional conduct which violates the law, their 
related blameworthiness is weighed against facts which might 
suggest reduced culpability.152 The affirmative defenses of 
insanity, extreme emotional disturbance, or duress exist 
because the law is grounded in the notion that for most 
proscriptions, mental states matter in determining 
culpability.153 
But it was not always this way. The view that a 
defendant’s mental state mattered in determining culpability is 
an outgrowth of important developments in enlightened 
society. Before the Twelfth Century, strict liability was the 
regular course for criminal law.154 The view that extenuating 
circumstances should matter in determining not only a 
defendant’s culpability but his punishment as well was entirely 
foreign. People were held strictly accountable and punished for 
their behavior alone.155 Whether someone intended to commit a 
crime or caused the prohibited conduct by recklessness or 
negligence was irrelevant to determinations of culpability and 
dispensing of punishments.156 The pre-twelfth criminal justice 
system operated efficiently and brutally: Trials were quick and 
dispensation of punishment quicker.157 
Succeeding years brought nuance to the criminal law.158 
Many critics of the current criminal code quite rightly lament 
its breadth and depth.159 Indeed, many behaviors are regulated 
and outlawed. And many of those are outlawed repeatedly 
through numerous layers of jurisdictions. But what is often 
neglected in this discussion is that the birth of this growth was 
partly due to the emergence of the doctrine of mens rea. That 
is, criminal law began its enlargement under the elementary 
premise that it mattered more what an agent intended than the 
                                                          
 152. See Farah, supra note 69, at 38. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 977 (1932) 
(“[F]or whatever the law in action may have been, [fragments of early English 
law] show that at least in the recorded law prior to the twelfth century, a 
criminal intent was not recognized as an indispensable requisite for 
criminality.”). 
 155. Id. at 97778 n.9. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See, e.g, id. at 976 (discussing trial by battle). 
 158. See id. at 100417. 
 159. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 507–08, 519–23 (2001). 
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actual harm caused by his conduct.160 Whether an agent should 
be punished severely or excused for causing the death of 
another is determined not by the behavior which resulted in 
the criminal conduct but by what he (or a reasonable person in 
the same situation) knew and intended.161 And while many 
scholars have questioned the nature of the reasonable person 
standard, those critiques largely agree that modern law gives 
credence to an agent’s mental states.162 Thus, justified 
homicide results in no punishment or blame because the law 
freely accepts the idea that it is permissible to kill another 
when under threat of immediate death from an aggressor. 
And to be free of blame is what results in freedom from 
punishment. The law holds the agent who justifiably kills 
outside the purview of punishment because to do otherwise 
would offend ordinary intuitions of blameworthiness.163 
Likewise, the law views predatory behavior as especially 
egregious because ordinary intuitions of justice suggest that 
agents who premeditate and carry out calculated crimes 
against innocent victims represent the pinnacle of blameworthy 
conduct which the law finds so offensive.164 It is offensive and 
punished severely not because the resulting harm is the 
greatest in any consequential sense, but simply because it so 
deeply trespasses against the shared intuitions of proper 
conduct venerated by most people. And those intuitions are 
shared not just provincially, but across cultures and 
generations.165 Despite all of our individual differences, most 
people agree that intentional unlawful conduct is worse than 
negligent behavior irrespective of the resulting harm.166 
These shared intuitions of justice can reveal much about 
the way people conceptualize behavior, blame, and punishment. 
A common critique suggests that in thinking about crime, 
people make judgments based on emotion.167 Indeed, several 
                                                          
 160. See Sayre, supra note 154, at 98894. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See, e.g., MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON 5–17 
(2003). 
 163. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 2, at 10. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. For a review of empirical studies examining intuitions of justice across 
demographics see Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and 
Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007). 
 167. Usually the emotion indentified in driving judgments about crime is 
fear. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL 
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cognitive neuroscience studies seem to suggest this is true.168 
Yet the subtle premise among such critiques is that this is 
inherently a bad thing and the legal process should do what it 
can to minimize it.169 And perhaps in some ways it should. But 
not much attention is paid to how such practices might destroy 
the common bond between the public and the criminal code 
which proscribes their conduct. If shared intuitions of justice 
are indeed mutual across all cultures then they serve as a 
touchstone of something that is uniquely emblematic of our 
humanity. At the least, these intuitions tell us what it means to 
hold someone blameworthy and not just responsible. 
Indeed, what makes the criminal law different from the 
civil code is the unique way it blames and punishes. When a 
tortfeasor is held liable, we blame her for her wrongdoing. We 
may even feel strong condemnation for her actions. But we do 
not make determinations about her character or value to 
society in the same way those judgments are exercised in 
criminal cases. Moral blameworthiness is the exclusive domain 
                                                          
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 10 (2001) (discussing the invocation of fear 
in crime control policy during the 1970s). But see Emily Gray et al., 
Reassessing the Fear of Crime, 5 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 363, 37377 (2008) 
(questioning the scope of that fear on methodological grounds). Vengeance is 
also commonly identified as being expressed in the criminal law. See Robert C. 
Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance: On Law and the Satisfaction of Emotion, in 
THE PASSIONS OF LAW 123 passim (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). For an 
overview of psychological research into emotions, see Neal Feigenson & 
Jaihyun Park, Emotions and Attributions of Legal Responsibility and Blame: 
A Research Review, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 143 (2006). 
 168. See Joshua W. Buckholtz et al. The Neural Correlates of Third-Party 
Punishment 60 NEURON 930, 935 (2008); Ming Hsu et al., The Right and the 
Good: Distributive Justice and Neural Encoding of Equity and Efficiency, 320 
SCI. 1092, 1095 (2008). 
 169. These arguments are often made based on examination of victim 
impact statements and crime scene photographs during trial. See¸ e.g., Jessica 
M. Salerno & Bette L. Bottoms, Emotional Evidence and Jurors’ Judgments: 
The Promise of Neuroscience for Informing Psychology and Law, 27 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 274, 27582 (2009) (reviewing studies of “emotional evidence” and 
arguing for a greater understanding of the role that emotion plays in jury 
decision-making). But see Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact 
Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM L. 611 (2009) (discussing empirical evidence 
which suggests no significant association between victim impact statements 
and sentencing outcomes); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Victim Characteristics 
and Victim Impact Evidence in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 308, 30910, 341 (2003) (finding no significant association between 
victim impact statements and sentencing outcomes in over 200 cases). 
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of the criminal law.170 It judges and condemns people for 
behavior which so deeply intrudes upon common intuitions of 
what people view as fundamentally necessary and right in an 
ordered society. It is hardly surprising, then, that criminal law 
traditionally reserves its most severe punishment for crimes 
which offend this intuitional (and institutional) social order: 
murder, rape, assault, and theft. It also is unsurprising that 
society seems rather undaunted about whether these 
punishments are consequentially effective at deterring crime. 
Under this lens, criminal law is not about consequential gains, 
but it is entirely rationale in a folk psychological sense. 
But those who view behavior from a cognitive neuroscience 
perspective are hardly impressed with these shared intuitions 
gleaned from generations. Instead, blame represents a vestige 
of our primordial pastthe all too frequent override of our 
primitive and emotional brain over our recently acquired 
cortex.171 They see our criminal justice system as foolishly wed 
to intuitions which are prone to biases and imprudently 
concerned with an agent’s intent.172 Indeed, the very notion 
that criminal behavior should be viewed as a criminal matter 
whatsoever makes little sense. Rather, crime is a sign of 
underlying brain pathology.173 Those who steal have impulsive 
brains;174 those who inflict pain and physical misery unto 
others are said to lack an empathic brain.175 Crime itself is a 
sign of epidemic mental disorder throughout the land. 
Punishment is irrational from this perspective. If agents 
are largely unable to control their conduct because of the 
determined nature of their brains, then it makes little sense to 
punish people for their conduct. Since punishment begins with 
social condemnation, it wrongly assumes that the convicted 
                                                          
 170. See Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility 
of Desert, 76 B. U. L. REV. 201, 202 (1996) (“Central to lay person’s view is that 
criminal sanctions signal moral condemnation, while civil penalties do not.”). 
 171. See Johannes Haushofer & Ernst Fehr, You Shouldn’t Have: Your 
Brain on Others Crimes, 60 NEURON 738,739 (2008). 
 172. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1776. 
 173. See Adrian Raine, From Genes to Brain to Antisocial Behavior, 17 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 323, 323 (2008) (“The key concept 
highlighted in this review is that specific genes result in structural and 
functional brain alterations that, in turn, predispose to antisocial behavior.”). 
 174. See generally id. at 324 (explaining that those who commit violent 
crime have impulsive brains). 
 175. See Alison Abbott, Abnormal Neuroscience: Scanning Psychopaths, 
450 NATURE 942, 942 (2007). 
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agent exercised control over his conduct. Instead of 
punishment, cognitive neuroscience desires to deploy a panoply 
of therapeutic interventions aimed at ameliorating future 
harm.176 Thus, instead of looking back at an agent’s wrongful 
conduct as the meter of his deserved punishment, cognitive 
neuroscience looks exclusively forward at an agent’s risk of 
future dangerousness.177 And while this criminal justice policy 
holds some luster because it measures deprivations of liberty 
entirely from a consequential perspective, it also accomplishes 
two secret ambitions of the cognitive neuroscience movement. 
First, it severs the measurement of punishment from ordinary 
intuitions of justice and fairness Second, it conveys 
construction of crime policy from a legal framework to one 
engineered by science. 
The amputation of punishment from the public’s intuitions 
is the grand hope which rides near the crest of neurolaw’s 
ambition. Few articles which discuss neuroscience and 
punishment fail to mention what is perceived as the malignant 
pathology within crime policy these days: the rise of 
retribution.178 And the blame for this rebirth of desert falls 
squarely on the influence that common intuitions of justice play 
in crafting crime policy.179 Critics contend that our modern 
criminal justice system is overwrought with placating the 
public’s demand for desert.180 Instead, they argue, we should 
entrust a forward-focused system, guided by experts who will 
dispassionately gauge confinement based on an offender’s 
propensities. After all, propensities can be ameliorated and 
managed, but what has happened in the past cannot be 
undone. 
While the critics may be right, they are short-sighted: 
mitigation and mercy are direct descendants of desert.181 Mercy 
                                                          
 176. Although few have argued directly for this result, it is a presumed 
goal given the foreseen influence of neuroscience with the criminal justice 
system and the ubiquity of the technology. Cf. Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, 
at 1781 (“At some further point this sort of brainware may be very widespread, 
with a high-resolution brain scanner in every classroom. People may grow up 
completely used to the idea that every decision is a thoroughly mechanical 
process. . . .”). 
 177. Id. at 1776. 
 178. Id. at 177678. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Snead, supra note 151, at 131922. 
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does not flow from an agent’s future propensities, but from her 
past circumstances which suggest she is less blameworthy. We 
feel sorry for the defendant who was repeatedly abused as a 
child, even if that abuse suggests a heightened risk for future 
harm to the public.182 If ordinary intuitions are indeed based on 
emotions, those emotions forgive as well as condemn. It may be 
the case that modern society does not enough of the former and 
too much of the latter, but employing more mercy may very 
well entail opening the emotional spigot of intuitions instead of 
welding them shut entirely.183 
And while focusing on an offender’s future propensities 
may appear more sensible than beckoning blame, it is dubious 
whether this will result in a more humane criminal justice 
system. Future propensities are notoriously difficult to 
externally manage. The work in criminal psychology has 
plainly demonstrated that two factors are largely responsible 
for recidivism across a diverse population of offenders. The first 
is alcohol and drug abuse; the second are dispositional traits 
that run to the core of an agent’s personality.184 Both are 
exceptionally recalcitrant to change and easily evasive of 
external monitoring even in therapeutic settings. But that has 
not prevented a host of legal prescriptions based on the 
therapeutic lens from being implemented for offenders deemed 
mentally unsound. And those legal prescriptions are hardly 
favorable for criminal defendants. 
For years, most sex offenders were punished and sentenced 
to prison. In 1996, the Supreme Court decided the case Kansas 
v. Henricks,185 which upheld a statute authorizing the civil 
commitment of sex offenders after they had served their prison 
sentences if they suffered from a mental abnormality. The 
statute merely required that a person subject to the statute 
have a condition which affected his “emotional or volitional 
                                                          
 182. See Cathy Spatz Widom, Child Abuse, Neglect, and Violent Criminal 
Behavior¸ 27 CRIMINOLOGY 251, 26063 (1989) (reporting a significant 
association between child abuse and arrests for violence during adulthood 
among a large sample of children). 
 183. The rise of the administrative state which is very isolated from 
common intuitions probably only hastens that trend. See Rachel E. Barkow, 
The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 1332, 136263 (2008). 
 184. See D.A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL 
CONDUCT (4th Ed. 2006) for a methodical overview of the identified risk 
factors for criminal recidivism. 
 185. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360, 371 (1997). 
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capacity”186 in a manner which predisposed him to commit 
sexually violent conduct. Because the aim of the statute was 
therapeutic and not punitive, Constitutional protections 
afforded to defendants were unavailable to Henricks. The 
prolonged incapacitation of people like Henricks is made 
possible by the very fact that they are within the civil mental 
health system and not under the regime of criminal 
punishment with its enumerated Constitutional protections. 
It may be difficult to feel much sympathy for people like 
Henricks, but his indefinite confinement is only possible 
because he is deemed to have a propensity for unlawful conduct 
caused by an amorphous mental abnormality that is considered 
amenable to therapeutic treatment. His predilection for 
pedophilia is a mental abnormality not just because the aim of 
his pursuits is illicit, but because he is said to lack control over 
his behavior. This dual determination that the content of his 
desires and inability to control them are a mental abnormality 
may have some folk psychological grounding. But the architect 
of the mentally disordered mindset prevalent in our culture is 
science itself. After all, it is the official diagnostic manual of 
psychiatry which holds seventeen different mental disorders 
based on sexual conduct.187 
Inasmuch as cognitive neuroscience promises to reveal how 
people think, its message has also been that behavior is 
routinely outside of the control of the agent.188 The reason why 
implicit biases matter is not that people may have them, but 
that they act on them.189 What neurolaw openly admits is what 
implicitly grants it power: that it can reveal how the mind 
operates and those revelations mean that science can craft 
                                                          
 186. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994). 
 187. DSM-IV REVISION, supra note 59, at 535–82. 
 188. See generally WEGNER, supra note 43, at 1–28 (arguing that the 
experience of consciously willing an action is not a direction indication that the 
conscious thought has caused the action—that it is actually a complex 
illusion). 
 189. The concept of implicit biases has received much scholarly attention, 
due in large part, to results of numerous studies utilizing the Implicit 
Association Test. For an overview, see Anthony G. Greenwaldt & Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 
951 (2006). But see Hart Blanton et al., Strong Claims and Weak Evidence: 
Reassessing the Predictive Validity of the IAT, 94 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 567, 
580–81(2009) (heavily criticizing the psychometric properties of the Implicit 
Association Test). 
ERICKSON LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  11:40 AM 
2010] BLAMING THE BRAIN 65 
policy better than the law.190 That is so because the mind 
executes behavior and it is conduct that the law regulates. In a 
determined world where minds occupy harmful intentions 
unknown even to those who possess them, the promise of 
science is its ability to discern with reasonable definitiveness 
how and when people will act on those intentions. This 
ineluctably places science in a better position in formulating 
crime policy when the only legitimate distributive principles of 
punishment are consequential ones. 
The coming transformation of our criminal justice system 
promised by the cognitive neuroscientists thus rests on a 
deceptively simple tripartite set of premises which has a 
profound implication. Quite audaciously, they assert that the 
human mind is a determined entity whose processes can be 
entirely revealed by the field of neuroscience; the determined 
nature of the mind means that concepts such as intention are 
illusory; and deserved punishment is illogical. The implications 
of these positions, however, bluntly challenge the nature and 
justification for a criminal justice system itself. If what 
differentiates the criminal justice system from civil regulation 
is its ability to punish for the sake of moral condemnation, then 
under the tripartite model of cognitive neuroscience the 
criminal justice system should dissolve as “the idea of 
distinguishing the truly, deeply guilty from those who are 
merely victims of neuronal circumstances” will indeed be 
pointless.191 After all, what could be considered criminal 
without a guilty mind?192 
B.  RISE OF THE CONTROL TESTS 
In most cases, it is axiomatic that to blame an agent of 
criminal conduct is to accuse her of possessing a guilty mind at 
the time of the offense. This link between blame and mind is a 
foundational bridge between law and the common intuitions of 
the people it governs. That is, the law holds to a strong account 
of human agency harmonious with how most people believe the 
                                                          
 190. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1781 (describing how 
neuroscience will play a central role in crime policy by making “detailed 
predictions about how the mechanical processes [of the mind] work”). 
 191. See id. 
 192. See Levitt, supra note 149, at 117 (“Nearly all the courts say that 
there can be no criminal act unless there has been a criminal intent; that a 
guilty mind must be present or no crime is committed.”). 
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mind operates.193 For the law, brains do not commit to 
contracts, become married, or commit crimespeople do.194 
Thus, people are accountable for their behaviors and the law 
can legitimately punish people for engaging in behaviors which 
the law dictates run afoul of the established code. That code is 
in many respects a social contract between the people and its 
government. 195 It is also a contract which provides assurances 
to individual citizens that they are expected to act lawfully 
irrespective of their personal propensities or liabilities towards 
unlawfulness. In turn, fellow citizens can expect the same from 
others. It is in this fashion that people can reasonably assume 
others will refrain from untoward acts of harm despite their 
impulse or robust desire to do otherwise. In sum, choices 
matter for personal responsibility under the law and in our 
society as well.196 
But the law has also long recognized that under certain 
circumstances, people are not responsible for their behavior. 
Substantive criminal law in most jurisdictions provides that a 
person is not guilty of a crime if he did not know or appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his actions due to a mental illness or 
defect. Almost all reasonable scientists these days hold to the 
                                                          
 193. As Chief Justice Biggs put it: 
The concept of mens rea, guilty mind, is based on the assumption that 
a person has a capacity to control his behavior and to choose between 
alternative courses of conduct. This assumption, though not 
unquestioned by theologians, philosophers and scientists, is necessary 
to the maintenance and administration of social controls. It is only 
through this assumption that society has found it possible to impose 
duties and create liabilities designed to safeguard persons and 
property. 
United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 773 (3d Cir. 1961); see also Charles C. 
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1936) (“[T]he law has been 
guided by a robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a 
working hypothesis in the solution of its problems.”); Speranza, supra note 34, 
at 125 (“Law, on the other hand, stands pre-eminently for the freedom of the 
will.”). 
 194. See Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal 
Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 397 (2006). 
 195. Cf. Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 74, 7980 
(1942) (“[T]he practical business of government and administration of the law 
is obliged to proceed on more or less rough and ready judgments based on the 
assumption that mature and rational persons are in control of their own 
conduct.”). 
 196. See 1 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW 266 
(2007) (“The capacity for executing choices provides the foundations for 
responsibility in criminal law.”). 
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biological hypothesis of mental illness.197 Those illnesses most 
associated with insanity claimspsychotic illnessesare 
presumed to originate in the brain and are principally involved 
with much of the behavior concerning claims of reduced 
culpability. Indeed, some of the most compelling evidence from 
neuroscience that bears on brains and behavior comes from 
studies demonstrating severe and enduring global deficits in 
the brains of people afflicted with psychotic illnesses.198 As 
commonly understood, the person is excused because of his 
impaired brain. That is, his afflicted brain is believed to 
obscure his true mind. But cognitive neuroscientists and their 
supporters claim that this distinction between brains, minds, 
and people is superfluous: all that matters is the brain.199 If 
that is true, then excusing agents because of their brains seems 
absurd. Brains cannot excuse the mind because they are one 
and the same. 
But what cognitive neuroscience supporters are really 
suggesting is not that excuse is illogical, but that that the legal 
emphasis on a defendant’s cognitive state is misplaced. In their 
view, an agent’s self-awareness is deceptive because they are 
entertained by a stout illusion of free will. Ascertaining 
whether an agent possessed a guilty mind at some point in the 
past is not only difficult but pointless. Determinations of 
whether an agent knew his behavior was wrong conflate 
knowledge with intention; to say an agent understood that his 
behavior was unlawful and acted anyway wrongly implies that 
he could have intended otherwise. 
Since cognitive neuroscience views intentions as illusory, 
                                                          
 197. See Carl I. Cohen, The Biomedicalization of Psychiatry: A Critical 
Overview, 29 COMTY. MENTAL HEALTH J. 509, 50910 (1993) (noting that 
biological psychiatry is now the dominant version of psychiatry); see also, 
Samuel H. Barondes, The Biological Approach to Psychiatry: History and 
Prospects, 10 J. NEUROSCIENCE 1707, 170809 (1990) (discussing the rise of 
biological psychiatry). 
 198. See Christos Pantelis et al., Structural Brain Imaging Evidence for 
Multiple Pathological Processes at Different Stages of Brain Development in 
Schizophrenia, 31 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 672 passim (2005) (reviewing the 
wealth of studies reporting numerous and significant abnormalities in brains 
of those afflicted with schizophrenia including progressive changes that occur 
during the earliest stages of the disease, often before the initiation of 
pharmacotherapy); see also Paul J. Harris & David A. Lewis, Neuropathology 
of Schizophrenia, in SCHIZOPHRENIA 310, 31025 (Steven R. Hirsch & Daniel 
Weinberger eds., 2003) for a general discussion on the various brain 
abnormalities associated with schizophrenia. 
 199. See Greene & Cohen, supra note 3, at 1779. 
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what matters are the biological and genetic propensities of the 
agent which are exercised from his brain.200 And while these 
properties are impinged by the environmental forces 
encountered by the agent during everyday life, the neurolaw 
view holds the agent as hapless in avoiding any of the 
untoward effects of those interactions. These behavioral 
propensities lodged deep within the brain are thought to result 
directly in conduct irrespective of an agent’s desires or wishes 
otherwise. Whatever self-awareness or willful movement 
actually entails, it’s domain over the biological circuitry of 
behavior is trivial. 
What this entails for criminal responsibility at the margins 
is a move towards control tests in excuse and diminished 
capacity defenses. That is, neurolaw asserts that what matters 
in determining an agent’s culpability is her volition and not her 
intentions or knowledge. By claiming science has illuminated 
that people operate in a manner quite divergent from their folk 
psychological beliefs, neurolaw hopes to bring biology to the 
foreground in forming social and legal norms. And because the 
disparity between common intuitions and cognitive 
neuroscience are their greatest in the realm of responsibility, 
neurolaw has focused its attention at influencing criminal law 
doctrine where accounts of responsibility are most salient. 
Supporters claim three closely related benefits from this 
neuro-jurisprudence model of criminal law. First, it removes 
blame from determinations of guilt and calculations of 
punishment. Because blame is viewed as a farrago of 
expressive judgments unwisely tethered to human passions, its 
impact on criminal adjudications can be avoided.201 Second, 
neuroscience will advance a preventive model of criminal 
justice aimed squarely at avoiding future harms.202 And third, 
neuroscience, aided by other fields of psychological science, can 
uncouple culpability determinations from the arm of criminal 
sanctions.203 
                                                          
 200. Id. at 1781. (“[Y]our brain serves as a bottleneck for all the forces 
spread throughout the universe of your past that affect who you are and what 
you do.”). 
 201. See id. at 1782. 
 202. Id. at 1783. 
 203. See Slobogin, supra note 9, at 165 (stating that “[t]he punishment 
model of the criminal law is currently threatened by the newly popular 
prevention model of intervention, one that is based on predictions of risk 
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All of these claimed benefits rest on the larger premise 
proffered by cognitive neuroscience which holds that agent’s 
self-awareness greatly inflates her true ability to control her 
conduct. Behavior generates from discharges of neuronal 
output which are largely (if not entirely) beyond the influence 
of consciousness. As a consequence, excuse should rest solely 
with determinations of volition. 
Legal formulations of excuse vary over jurisdictions and 
have unquestionably been influenced by cultural perceptions of 
the mind and mental illness.204 Yet quintessentially the 
doctrine holds that a person is not responsible for a criminal 
conduct if during the commission of the crime, due to a mental 
illness or defect, he lacks substantial capacity to either 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct 
to the requirements of the law.205 This standard test holds that 
excuse is warranted when a defendant lacks the awareness to 
know right from wrong or is unable to control himself.206 And 
while the time and venue have favored one part of this test over 
the other, the cognitive prong has resolutely remained intact 
over the years. 
But cognitive neuroscience promises fundamental change 
to the excuse doctrine. While it confidently articulates an 
ability to discern how people think, it also suggests that 
individual awareness plays a minimal role in the course of day 
to day conduct. Instead, behavior is mostly an autonomous 
process whereby people mechanically respond to stimuli 
presented to them.207 Concepts deeply engrained in criminal 
law, such as intent, are considered remnants of the folk 
psychological belief required by society that obeying the law 
necessitates thinking and choosing by an agent. That this view 
might suggest a radical overhaul of criminal liability in its 
entirety has not gone without notice among its 
proponentsindeed much of the neurolaw literature gleefully 
anticipates it. But institutional change tends to come 
incrementally. The emerging dominance of control tests in 
culpability assessments is the first brick removed from the 
                                                          
uncabined by culpability assessments.”). 
 204. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE (1993). 
 205. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1968). 
 206. Id. 
 207. See ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND 
ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 12 (1986). 
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pillar of mens rea in criminal law. 
And while institutional change is a necessary force within 
law, science stands apart from political and other authorities 
who impinge legal doctrine because it is seen as empirical and 
objective. Arguments favoring the demise of desert in favor of 
consequential sanctions can be appealing for a variety of 
reasons. But those which rely heavily on neuroscience entail 
prediction of future behavior as the linchpin of their reforms. 
Instead of utilizing common intuitions of guilt as the meter for 
deserved punishment, those who propose a neuro-person model 
of culpability place their faith in the ability of the behavioral 
sciences to accurately predict future behavior. Control tests 
satisfy this reform because they imply a persistent impairment 
of behavioral capacity. 
While prediction of behavior has endured its share of heavy 
criticism over the years, the rise of a new method is enjoying 
wide acceptance from mental health professionals and the 
courts. Actuarial risk assessment uses crude analysis of 
historical data to predict future behaviorranging from sexual 
recidivism to violence.208 These methods are already broadly 
employed by experts in all stages of civil and criminal 
adjudications where risk of unlawful or undesirable conduct is 
of concern.209 Due in large measure to the legal conversion of 
acts of rape and pedophilia from crimes to mental 
abnormalities,210 cases turning on expert assessment of future 
dangerousness are legion.211 Consideration of future 
dangerousness by way of these behavioral assessments 
dominates sentencing in capital cases as well.212 Sentencing 
alternatives, including the heralded drug and mental health 
                                                          
 208. See John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting 
Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 40809 
(2006). 
 209. Id. at 408-09 nn.71-72. 
 210. The behaviors associated with these crimes are now deemed mental 
abnormalities as well as criminal conduct under the law. See Erickson, supra 
note 56, at 7273. 
 211. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION 39108 (2007); 
Monahan, supra note 208, at 396404; see also David DeMatteo & John F. 
Edens, The Role and Relevance of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised in Court: 
A Case Law Survey of U.S. Courts (1991-2004), 12 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 
214, 214 (2006) (noting the prevalence of admitting an instrument for 
measuring psychopathy in civil and criminal cases). 
 212. See Snead supra, note 151, at 132224 (2007). 
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courts, are premised on the idea that interventional behavioral 
treatments will reduce future illegal behavior in predictable 
waysand that those who may benefit from these 
interventions can be determined and selected from the general 
pool of offenders.213 The marriage between behavioral 
prediction and interventional therapeutics is strong and 
growing stronger by the day. 
What is often neglected in discussions about this new 
science of prediction, however, is how closely the science 
mirrors common intuitions. The empirical literature within the 
behavioral sciences strongly suggests that the largest risk 
factors for future unlawful behavior are ones found in lay 
judgments about punishment and risk. Prior bad acts, chronic 
drug abuse, and an offender’s penchant for violating social 
norms weigh heavily in favor of recidivism in both camps. And 
while science can claim that its approach is methodically and 
analytically superior, it has yet to demonstrate how its 
approach generalizes to superior understandings about 
population trends. That is, science is on par with lay intuitions 
about individual recidivism factors, but it remains a mystery 
why crime rates rise and fall over time despite all of the 
sophisticated empirical analyses employed over the yearsjust 
as most lay intuitions seem dumbfounded to explain these 
trends. 
The prediction model, however, openly favors experts. It 
desires distributive punishment as an enterprise that has a 
strong fidelity to incapacitation and the prevention of future 
harms. And within this model, someone must judge and 
determine who is dangerous and should be detained and who is 
harmless and should go free. To accomplish this task, the 
prediction model must invariably engage in the precarious side 
of what lay intuitions do in ascertaining risk: grouping people 
by their shared traits. Psychological science has long 
demonstrated that people have the tendency to make 
judgments about othersparticularly when judging riskby 
using heuristic cues about individuals that imply membership 
to a larger group.214 Whether that means the individual is left-
handed and the person judging him implicitly views all left-
handed people as a passive bores entertained by math and 
                                                          
 213. See Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief 
Primer, 23 LAW & POL’Y 125, 131135 (2001). 
 214. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974). 
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crossword puzzles or the individual retains membership to a 
certain ethnicity and the person views that ethnicity with 
suspicion or contempt, unconscious cues seem to matter in how 
people make day to day judgments about risk. 
To make predictions about a person’s risk of future 
behavior means placing that person within a group with known 
risk factors. No one seriously entertains the idea that a 
prediction model based on neuroscience would engage in overt 
racism by pooling race as a risk factor. The difference between 
lay intuitions which group people based on heuristics and a 
prediction model assembled by experts would be that the latter 
would not be influenced by overt prejudices. But inescapably, 
that model would hold manifestly genetic factors as important 
and thus group offenders together because of that fact. Indeed, 
this is already being done. One of the most prevalent sex 
offender recidivism assessment tools employed by experts 
weights gender as a significant risk factor215as it should. 
The harm is not that future prevention models would 
routinely employ genetic factors such as gender in 
determinations of future dangerousness. They would be foolish 
not to do so. But wedding cognitive neuroscience and the 
prevention model risks classifying brains based on what is not 
manifestly evident to most people. To say that an offender 
poses a risk of future harm because of deficient 
neurotransmitter production216 or slight delays in pressing keys 
when viewing illicit images217 removes these determinations 
from any grounding in common intuitions. That those who 
support the prediction model suggest that people outside of the 
traditional purview of the criminal justice system might also be 
                                                          
 215. Known as the Static-99, this actuarial scale uses gender as one of the 
ten items it evaluates. See Static-99 Clearinghouse, http://www.static99.org/ 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2009). 
 216. A proposed link between deficit production of a neurotransmitter 
known as serotonin and violence was established less than a decade ago. See 
Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated 
Children, 297 SCI. 851, 853 (2002). But see Niel Risch et al., Interaction 
Between the Serotonin Transporter Gene (5-HTTLPR), Stressful Life Events, 
and Risk of Depression: A Meta-Analysis, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2462, 2468 
(showing no link between the proposed serotonin gene and psychological 
disorder). 
 217. See Gillian Smith & Lane Fischer, Assessment of Juvenile Sexual 
Offenders: Reliability and Validity of the Abel Assessment, 11 SEXUAL ABUSE 
207 passim (1999) for a review of this controversial, yet widely used 
psychological test. 
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within the scope of such a model suggests the reach would be 
massive. Rather than reverse the breadth and depth of the 
current criminal justice system, the prediction model seems all 
too likely to expand it greatly. 
C.  ABOLITION OF AGENCY 
Most people believe that they have an ability to impose 
their desires and intentions in the world. They also believe that 
others, absent severe mental or neurological disease, do the 
same. In common sense terms, as well, some people have more 
difficulty controlling their conduct than others.218 Some can 
indulge in alcohol to moderation while others cannot, in part, 
because of their biology. To be born means to be born with 
biological attributes and liabilities. 
The law embodies this view of humanity because it is 
fundamentally a human enterprise. The law of legislatures and 
courts is not the law of physics or chemistry. It does not exist 
independent of the judgments of those who are subject to its 
rules. Rather, it exists because those who are subject to its 
rules value certain beliefs and ideals which the law 
incorporates into its code. The force of law is bolstered or 
subdued by the bind of humanity which is under its rule. 
Justice means different things to different people, but few 
would hold that letting the guilty go free or punishing the 
innocent are just outcomes. These shared beliefs about justice 
reveal important aspects of the law which are necessary for 
people to view it as legitimate and fair. Nowhere are these 
shared beliefs stronger than in conduct deemed criminalthey 
go to the core of what it means for law to do justice.219 
These shared intuitions, then, are vital to the criminal 
law’s operation. Irrespective of whether they are imprudently 
influenced by emotions or prone to manipulation by cunning 
                                                          
 218. See Stephen J. Morse, Against Control Tests for Criminal 
Responsibility, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 1 (Paul H. Robinson et al. 
eds., 2009). 
 219. See Paul H. Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared Intuitions of 
Justice, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 163438 (2007) (demonstrating a consensus on 
the core intuitions of justice even across demographics and cultures). This core 
consensus occurs during early development. See Jonathan Haidt et al., Affect, 
Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?, 65 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 613, 617, 62122 (1993) (observing that children ten to twelve 
years old across the cultures investigated think that pushing another child off 
a swing should be punished and that this behavior would be wrong in other 
countries as well). 
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persuasion,220 they lie at the heart of what it means to condemn 
others and justify punishment. We punish and condemn 
because we blame people for behaving wrongly. And that blame 
is not just a statement that someone has transgressed against 
the law, but is a proclamation that they have violated deeply 
held social norms important to most people.221 
The mode of neurolaw is one divorced from this 
understanding. Its explanations are geared toward undoing 
conventional models of crime and punishment in favor of one 
built on mechanistic accounts of behavior. Aided by technology 
that few understand, neurolaw’s draw is its promise to unravel 
the mysteries of the mind and demonstrate that thinking and 
behavior are predictable given its mechanical and determined 
naturethat the mind is not that great of a mystery after all. 
So, too, does the prediction model seek in unraveling the 
influence of intuitions from judgments of guilt and punishment. 
As a forward-focused enterprise, prediction is liberated from 
determinations of blameworthiness. Instead, its goal is cabined 
within the expertise of science in judging future harm based on 
the view that incapacitation as the central pillar of crime policy 
distributes justice more fairly and rationally. 
Both neurolaw’s explanation of behavior and the prediction 
model’s goal of moving sentencing determinations into the 
realm of prevention diminish the concept of the guilty mind in 
criminal law. Neurolaw claims awareness and intention are 
minefields of illusions; prediction models view the past 
intentions of an agent as irrelevant. Uncoupling guilt from 
criminal sanctions is considered both principled and prudential: 
the guilty mind requirement is extraneous and pointless; it also 
stands in the way of a criminal justice system based on 
prevention of future harm. And prevention of future harm 
necessarily means employing legal sanctions before the 
occurrence of unlawful conductbefore the criminal act arises. 
After all, that is what preventive detention is all about. 
The breadth and depth of that system of criminal justice 
will be massive. The real danger will not be that neurolaw will 
                                                          
 220. The argument against intuitional judgments usually falls on the 
notion that they are emotionally laden and irrational. See JESSE J. PRINZ, THE 
EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS (2007). 
 221. Cf. Jeffery J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1537, 153942 (2000) (discussing the difficulties in using social norms for 
public policy). 
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completely undo criminal law but that it will retain the vast 
power of criminal law to sanction behavior while removing 
personal responsibility from the legal presumption that 
unlawful conduct deserves to be punished. Unlawful behavior 
will be seen as indicative of a sick mind with its agent 
hopelessly along for the ride. Rational crime policy will entail 
therapeutic interventions instead of punishment. Those 
interventions will have all of the callings of the rehabilitative 
ideal but will rest squarely on calculated determinations of 
future harm. And there is little reason to believe that those 
interventions will be any less intrusive or the determinations 
any more liberating than the current system. Indeed, there is 
every reason to believe they will fail to meet those objectives. 
Understanding the consequences of neurolaw’s vision for 
the criminal justice system begins with appreciating its 
ambition. As a movement which considers the mind as entirely 
reducible to explanatory models of neuronal discharge, it 
steadfastly maintains that all human mentation will be 
revealed through technology. The plain purpose of this 
knowledge will be to grant the natural sciences authority in 
defining and explaining not just human behavior but the very 
essence of humanity. Such authority will be difficult for the law 
to resist since it is fundamentally rooted in regulating human 
behavior. That authority will play a larger role in formulating 
crime policy, and in so doing, will ineluctably lead towards 
polices which emphasize behavioral prediction and 
incapacitation. 
But this is also a movement that views folk psychological 
ideas such as the guilty mind with deep suspicion. As a 
consequence, the demarcation between what the law considers 
criminal and civil is also suspect. Effective crime policy from a 
neurolaw perspective is not wedded to folk psychological 
notions of wrongfulness or even diseased minds.222 Instead, the 
limits are the reach of what the behavioral sciences deems its 
expertise and what legislators consider amenable to social 
welfare policy. From this position, neurolaw’s cadence of 
therapeutic corrections will flow freely as the idea of 
punishment is relegated to the province of history. Desert, and 
                                                          
 222.  See Bruce J Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 
3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 184, 193 (1997) (“Even people in the criminal 
justice system who may not have mental health problems per se may be 
thought of as having problems within the purview of therapeutic 
jurisprudence.”). 
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the human intuitions from which it flows, will finally be excised 
from the judgments of wrongfulness. 
In place of those judgments will be the measures of science. 
Those gauged dimensions of lawful capacity and illicit 
propensities will be the underpinnings of this new criminal 
justice system. Rather than anchored by entrenched social 
norms which consider some behaviors altruistic and others 
barbaric, it will project human experience as a random 
accident; the fruits of human labor as happenstance 
occurrences. The method of neurolaw, quite simply, 
understands the mind so elementarily as to see right through it 
entirely and instead view it solely as mechanical circuitry 
devoid of any of its human meaning. 
What can it claim of value to the law then? It asserts that 
actions are blameless because of an explanation which is no 
explanation at all: only a description which holds motives as 
the exclusive domain of propagating genes and their protein 
offspring.223 To say that behavior is biological is besides the 
pointfew would seriously contend otherwise. But what the 
law really cares aboutand has always cared aboutare the 
reasons that people attribute to their intentions and behavior. 
The language of law is a mirror of humanity which reflects a 
rudimentary understanding that people behave because they 
have reasons and those reasons manifestly retain value to most 
people.224 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Foundational to our criminal law as commonly understood 
is the premise that the state cannot impose punishment where 
it cannot impose blame. This quality of the criminal code is the 
source for its unique capacity to condemn and sanction severely 
by depriving liberty. The act of punishment not only decrees 
social condemnation but incapacitates because it assumes that 
those who acted wrongly will choose to do so again unless they 
bear the full weight of shame society assigns to criminal 
conduct. By necessity, behavior judged criminal is thusly 
considered by its nature to be willful in a folk psychological 
                                                          
 223.  See Dawkins, supra note 47. 
 224.  Cf. Rollin M. Perkins, A Rationale for Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 
905, 905 (1939) (“Deeply ingrained in human nature is the tendency to 
distinguish intended results from accidental happenings.”). 
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sense. 
That moral sense shared across cultures and generations 
also understands that people are rooted in their biological 
nature but not defined by it. Few routinely say that their 
abilities and desires are solely attributable to their constituent 
genetic code. Indeed, civilized society has long rejected the idea 
that personhood should be narrowly circumscribed by one’s 
biology. People reject that idea not only because of its ugly past, 
but because most people intuitively know that they are 
constituted by their biology but are not identical to it.225 There 
is something more to being a person than biology can tell us. 
Just as well, people universally desire explanations for 
behavior. Most explanations leave us unsatisfied. It is a 
uniquely human trait to ponder endlessly why people act and 
behave as they do. The allure of cognitive neuroscience is its 
promise to make the object of that inquiry transparent.226 But 
in so doing, it must remove the attributes which make it 
inimitably human. There is no greed or malice or goodwill, only 
biophysical flotsam and jetsam and the discharge of neurons.227 
And in the process, that explanation destroys the social 
intuitions of behavior which give the law its meaning. Blaming 
the brain for unlawful behavior is not blame at all. Rather, it 
submits justice to the efficient calculation of science itself and 
binds it to that pursuit exclusively. A resolute belief in the 
value of common intuitions is necessary to the very idea of 
justice which is not tyranny or obedience which is not slavery. 
                                                          
 225. See, e.g., Walter Glannon, Our Brains Are Not Us, 23 BIOETHICS 321, 
321 (2009) (“[T]he brain is necessary but not sufficient to account for all the 
physiological and psychological properties that make each of us a unique 
person.”). 
 226. And when matters are transparent, there is nothing left to measure. 
See generally LEONARD COHEN, THE FUTURE (Sony/ATV Songs 1992). 
 227. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. 
CAL. L REV. 251, 252, 253 (2000) (discussing the limits of scientific 
explanations for behavior under a legal lens). 
